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We the Corporations?: The
Constitutionality of Limitations on
Corporate Electoral Speech
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By JESSICA A. LEVINSON*
[Corporations] are not themselves members of “We the People” by
whom and for whom our Constitution was established.1
Introduction
CORPORATIONS ARE NOT, IN FACT, living, breathing human be-
ings, and therefore should not be treated as such in the campaign
finance context.2 While this may seem like an obvious statement and
conclusion, a majority of the United States Supreme Court does not
agree. In its much-maligned January 2010 decision in Citizens United v.
* Jessica A. Levinson is a Visiting Associate Clinical Professor at Loyola Law School
Los Angeles. The author wishes to thank all who attended the Loyola Law School faculty
workshop in the summer of 2011. Professors Ellen Aprill, Aaron Kaplan, and Kathryn
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discussed in this Article. Sincere gratitude to Dean Sean Scott for making so many things
possible, including this Article. This work was supported by the Loyola Faculty Research
Fellowship Program. The author owes a debt of gratitude to all of the members of the USF
Law Review who worked on this Article.
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
2. It is settled that corporations are “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). This, of course, does not mean
that corporations must be treated as identical to individuals in the campaign finance con-
text. As Justice White correctly noted in dissent in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 804 (1978) (White, J., dissenting), “an examination of the First Amendment val-
ues that corporate expression furthers and the threat to the functioning of a free society it
is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible with communications emanating from
individuals and is subject to restrictions which individual expression is not.” Similarly, Pro-
fessor Ribstein has explained that “even if the corporation is a constitutional ‘person,’ it
does not necessarily follow that its speech is accorded the same protection as individuals’
speech.” Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 124
(1992).
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Federal Election Commission,3 the Court held—in sweeping and con-
clusory language—that when it comes to spending money for or
against political candidates, corporations should be treated identical
to human beings.4 That conclusion is not only wrong, but is also ill-
conceived.
This Article uses Citizens United as a vehicle to provide an initial
look at the relationship between the theories of the First Amendment
and the conceptions of the corporate form, studied through the lens
of electoral speech. This Article broadly explores the interplay be-
tween the speech interests of corporations and their members5 in en-
gaging in electoral speech and the different theories of the corporate
personality. Against that backdrop, this Article discusses a number of
reasons why—contrary to what the majority said in Citizens United—the
government has a compelling interest in limiting corporate electoral
speech.
In the campaign finance context, the Court should be concerned
with the interests of distinct but overlapping groups—spenders’ inter-
ests in speaking, the government’s interest in curbing corruption and
promoting speech rights, and non-spending speakers’ and listeners’
interests in speaking and hearing political speech. The interests of
each of these groups are furthered by restrictions on for-profit6 corpo-
rate electoral spending.
When analyzing campaign finance restrictions, the Court should
first determine whether a campaign finance law impermissibly bur-
3. 130 S. Ct. 876.
4. This Article focuses on corporate electoral speech concerning candidates for po-
litical office and leaves for another day a full discussion of corporate lobbying and corpo-
rate speech concerning other issues, such as ballot measures. In addition, this Article does
not address the propriety of restrictions on media corporations, who are dedicated to dis-
seminating information.
5. As used in this Article, “members” refers to those closely affiliated with corpora-
tions, including directors, and officers. In the case of for-profit corporations, the term
“members” includes shareholders. In the case of non-profit corporations, the term “mem-
bers” is used in this Article to refer to individuals who choose to associate themselves with
those organizations, such as by donating time or money.
6. In arguing that corporations must be treated as distinct from individuals in the
campaign finance context, this Article draws a distinction between speech by for-profit and
certain non-profit corporations. Non-profit corporations, unlike for-profit corporations, do
not have shareholders who receive residual earnings and are specifically prohibited from
receiving any of the assets or property of the corporation. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming
Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 502–07 (1981); Henry B. Hansmann, The
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 843–45 (1980). As discussed infra, members of
for-profit corporations lack the free speech rights of members of some non-profit corpora-
tions, and there are various concerns raised by for-profit electoral speech which do not
arise from the same speech by many non-profit corporations.
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dens the rights of the speaker. In the context of electoral speech, a
speaker is equivalent to a spender.7 Neither the First Amendment
rights of a for-profit corporation itself, nor those of the individual
members of a for-profit corporation, are furthered by unrestricted
electoral speech.
The Court should next analyze the government’s interest in im-
plementing the restriction. In the past the Court has correctly em-
braced a broad understanding of the compelling governmental
interests furthered by campaign finance restrictions;8 since Citizens
United, however, the Court has found that the prevention of corrup-
tion or the appearance of corruption—narrowly defined as quid pro
quo corruption—is the only interest sufficient to uphold campaign fi-
nance restrictions.9 Under a broader, common sense definition of cor-
ruption—which embraces undue influence and preferential access—
the government is able to address the serious threats to the integrity
of the electoral system. In addition, when a corporation is the speaker,
the government is concerned with the rights of shareholders raised by
unrestricted for-profit corporate electoral speech.
Finally, when analyzing campaign finance restrictions, the Court
should focus on the First Amendment rights of the rest of society,
both to listen and to speak. Currently the Court focuses solely on listen-
ers’ rights and erroneously finds that those rights are furthered by
unrestricted corporate electoral speech. However, the rights of listen-
ers are not promoted by such speech, which can distort the political
marketplace. In addition, the Court must depart from its current juris-
prudential model and take into consideration not only the First
Amendment rights of the person or entity spending money (the
speaker), the government’s interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption, and the listeners’ interests in hearing elec-
toral speech, but also the First Amendment rights of those members
of the public who speak, but not through the use of funds.10 Those
non-spending speakers could be crowded out of the political dis-
course without limits on for-profit corporate electoral speech. It is
7. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court found that in the political context,
money is essentially the equivalent to speech.
8. See infra Part I.
9. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909–11. As a result, the number of cam-
paign finance restrictions that can withstand constitutional scrutiny has been severely
limited.
10. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging the “competing First Amendment interests” at play when re-
strictions on corporate electoral speech are at issue).
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therefore vital for the Court to consider the First Amendment rights
of those who are speaking, but not spending money. When it comes to
the ability of for-profit corporations to spend unlimited sums to pro-
duce electoral speech, the interest of each of these three groups
weighs in favor of restrictions.11
In arguing that for-profit corporations should not be treated as
identical to individuals and some non-profit corporations, this Article
focuses on one type of speech by corporations—the ability of corpora-
tions to spend unlimited general treasury funds on advertisements ad-
vocating the election or defeat of candidates. The provision of federal
law overturned by the Supreme Court in Citizens United addressed only
this issue, but the Court made sweeping conclusions about the pur-
ported impermissibility of speaker-based identity restrictions.12
Specifically, the Citizens United Court struck down a portion of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”), commonly known as the
McCain-Feingold Act.13 The provision at issue prohibited corpora-
tions from using general treasury funds on so-called “electioneering
communications.”14 Corporations could, however, speak in the politi-
cal marketplace by creating separate segregated funds, commonly
known as political action committees (“PACs”).15 This Article, in ex-
plaining why for-profit corporate electoral speech must be treated as
distinct from most non-profit and individual electoral speech, puts
forth a number of reasons why Citizens United was wrongly decided.16
11. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“Campaign finance distinctions based on corporate identity tend to be less worri-
some, in other words, because the ‘speakers’ are not natural persons, much less members
of our political community, and the governmental interests are of the highest order.”).
12. Relying on the Court’s language concerning the impermissibility of speaker-based
identity restrictions, at least one court has concluded that restrictions prohibiting corpora-
tions from giving direct contributions to candidates are invalid under the First Amend-
ment. United States v. Danielczyk, 788 F. Supp. 2d 472 (E.D. Va. 2011).
13. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.
14. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006). An electioneering communication is “any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal
office” made within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election. Id.
§ 434(f)(3)(A).
15. Id. § 441b(b)(2). Donations to PACs can be received only from employees of the
corporation and stockholders. Id. § 441b(b)(4)(A)–(B). Corporations can control the op-
erations of their PACs because they appoint the board of the PAC. Frances R. Hill, Corpo-
rate Philanthropy and Campaign Finance: Exempt Organizations as Corporate-Candidate Conduits,
41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881, 908 (1997); see FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm. (NRWC), 459
U.S. 197, 200 n.4 (1982).
16. While there are numerous reasons why the majority’s opinion in Citizens United is
ill-reasoned, this Article does not endeavor to provide a comprehensive list of those
reasons.
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Part I briefly summarizes federal laws that treat corporations as
distinguishable from individuals in the campaign finance context and
examines Supreme Court case law addressing that difference. Part II
discusses a number of theories behind the purpose of the First
Amendment and of the theoretical conception of the corporate per-
sonality. Part III focuses on a corporate speaker’s interest in using
general treasury funds to make electioneering communications and
explains why the speech rights of for-profit corporations and their
members are low when the speech at issue is electoral speech. Part III
also explains why, far from promoting the interests of listeners, for-
profit corporate electoral speech actually harms the interests of listen-
ers and non-spending speakers. Part IV outlines the compelling gov-
ernmental interests that demonstrate the propriety of restrictions on
for-profit corporate electoral spending, namely concerns of corrup-
tion and shareholder protection. This Article concludes by reiterating
the need to treat for-profit corporations as distinct from most non-
profit corporations and natural persons in the political marketplace.
This section of the Article explains which electoral speech made by
certain non-profit corporations must be protected under the First
Amendment.
I. Congress and the Courts Have Recognized the Need to
Treat Corporations as Distinct from Individuals in the
Campaign Finance Context
For more than a century, Congress and the Court have recog-
nized the undisputable and unremarkable fact that corporations are
not natural persons. Beginning at the turn of the twentieth century,
Congress acknowledged the need to restrict the flow of corporate
money into the political system.
The Court has, until recently, long-respected this legislative judg-
ment and has in many instances recognized the doctrinal and practi-
cal need to treat corporations17 as distinct from individuals. The
following provides a brief history of federal laws that treat corpora-
tions as distinct from individuals and summarizes Supreme Court
cases that address that distinction.
17. Some of the laws and rulings discussed infra address the distinction between indi-
viduals and corporations generally and do not focus specifically on the difference between
individuals and for-profit corporations.
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A. For Over One Hundred Years Congress Has Treated Corporate
Electoral Speech as Different from Individual Electoral
Speech
The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orienta-
tion of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in
the electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitu-
tional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures de-
signed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of
corporate spending in local and national races.18
Congress has long recognized that corporations lack the same
First Amendment rights as individuals and that corporate electoral
spending poses unique threats to the integrity of the electoral and
political systems. Therefore, since 1907, Congress has treated corpora-
tions as different from individuals in the campaign finance context. In
that year, Congress passed the Tillman Act, banning corporations
from giving direct contributions to federal candidates.19 Congress
passed the Tillman Act for two primary reasons, and these remain the
two primary governmental interests that are used to justify, and should
be sufficient to uphold, restrictions on corporate electoral speech.
First, Congress wished to address concerns of actual or apparent cor-
ruption due to the explosion of corporate wealth and the subsequent
increase in corporate electoral spending throughout the country.20
Second, Congress sought to protect shareholders from having their
money used to support candidates with whom they disagreed.21
Four decades after the enactment of the Tillman Act, Congress
passed the Taft-Hartley Act (also known as the Labor Management
Relations Act).22 This 1947 law prohibited corporations and labor un-
ions from making independent expenditures in support of, or in op-
position to, federal candidates.23 Taft-Hartley was the precursor to the
18. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
19. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. § 441b).
20. See EDWIN M. EPSTEIN, CORPORATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS:
FEDERAL REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 12 (1968).
21. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 952 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“[T]he [Tillman] Act was primarily driven by two pressing concerns: first, the
enormous power corporations had come to wield in federal elections, with the accompany-
ing threat of both actual corruption and a public perception of corruption; and second, a
respect for the interest of shareholders and members in preventing the use of their money
to support candidates they opposed.” (citations omitted)).
22. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
23. Id. § 304, 61 Stat. at 159.
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provision of McCain-Feingold struck down by the Court in Citizens
United.
Almost twenty-five years later, in 1971, Congress passed the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).24 In 1974 and 1976, Congress
passed significant amendments to that Act.25 The FECA, among other
things, maintained the corporate restrictions contained in the Till-
man Act and the Taft-Hartley Act and codified the ability of corpora-
tions and labor unions to use PACs to make independent
expenditures.26 Congress enacted the FECA and subsequent amend-
ments to that act for the same two reasons it enacted the Tillman
Act—to guard against corruption that may arise from corporate politi-
cal spending and to protect the shareholders of corporations that
sought to spend money in the political marketplace.27
Congress’ next major overhaul of the campaign finance system
came in 2002 with the passage of the BCRA.28 The BCRA strength-
ened the FECA’s prohibition on corporate spending on advertise-
ments advocating the election or defeat of federal candidates by
closing certain loopholes in the law.29
24. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3.
25. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-433, 88 Stat.
1263; Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat.
475.
26. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006). In 1972, the Court cited a member of Congress who
proclaimed that the use of PACs allowed for “the proper balance in regulating corporate
and union political activity required by sound policy and the Constitution.” Pipefitters Lo-
cal Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 431 (1972) (interpreting the Taft-Hartley
Act, which had created the PAC option); see also Adam Winkler, Other People’s Money, 92
GEO. L.J. 871, 934 (2004) [hereinafter Winkler, Other People’s Money] (explaining the im-
portance of the PAC option to shareholders’ rights); Adam Winkler, The Corporation in
Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1262 (1999) [hereinafter Winkler, The Corporation
in Election Law] (discussing the creation and necessity of the PAC option).
27. The two primary purposes of section 441b of the FECA, which contained the pro-
hibition against corporations from using general treasury funds on independent expendi-
tures, were to: (1) “ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special
advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into
political ‘war chests’ which could be used to incur political debts from legislators who are
aided by the contributions”; and (2) “protect the individuals who have paid money into a
corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from having that
money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.” NRWC, 459
U.S. 197, 207–08 (1982).
28. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codi-
fied primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.).
29. Section 203 of the BCRA, which prohibited corporations from using general trea-
sury funds on electioneering communications, was drafted as a response to a loophole
created by the Buckley Court. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark
Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Fi-
nance Disclosure Laws, 26 NEXUS CHAP. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59. 66–67 (2011). The Buckley
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As this brief legislative history demonstrates, for more than a cen-
tury Congress has demonstrated a consistent, unwavering commit-
ment to treating corporations as different from individuals in the
campaign finance context.30 Prior to Citizens United, the Court had ac-
cepted that Congress could subject corporations to more restrictions
than could validly apply to individuals when the speech concerned
candidate elections.31
B. For Decades, the Supreme Court Has Recognized the Need to
Treat Corporate Electoral Speech Concerning
Candidates as Distinct from the Same Speech by
Individuals
The Court has long respected legislative judgments concerning
the need to treat corporate electoral speech concerning candidates as
distinct from individual electoral speech advocating the election or
defeat of candidates.32
In 1976, in Buckley v. Valeo—the Supreme Court’s seminal case in
the area of campaign finance law—the Court reviewed the constitu-
Court read the FECA as prohibiting speakers from making independent expenditures only
where the communication contained the so-called “magic words” of express advocacy, such
as “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” “cast your ballot for,” “Smith for Congress,” “vote against,”
“defeat,” and “reject.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. Hence, as long as a spender avoided use
of the magic words, she could spend unlimited funds on communications that in essence
advocated for the election or defeat of federal candidates. Richard L. Hansen, Beyond Inco-
herence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1064, 1074 (2008). Those communications, unlimited under Buckley’s reading of the
FECA, were called “sham issue advertisements.” See id. Section 203 of the BCRA substan-
tially closed that loophole by clarifying the meaning of “electioneering communications.”
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 103 (2003); see also Winkler, Other People’s Money, supra
note 26, at 935 (“The BCRA’s new limitations on corporate and union electoral activity
further restrict executives’ ability to misuse ‘other people’s money’ by prohibiting expendi-
ture of general treasury funds on parties or sham issue advertising campaigns.”).
30. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 946 n.46 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Congress and half the state legislatures have concluded, over
many decades, that their core functions of administering elections and passing legislation
cannot operate effectively without some narrow restrictions on corporate electioneering
paid for by general treasury funds.”); see also C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corpo-
rate Political Expenditures and Redish’s the Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 648–49
(1982) (“Passage of these laws was thus the product of a people’s attempts to exercise some
control over their destiny, and the object of the laws, moreover, was to create a political
process that would better enable people to exercise such control.”).
31. See, e.g., NRWC, 459 U.S. at 209–10.
32. The one exception to this statement is FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238 (1986) discussed infra, where the Court carved out a small exception to the
general prohibition against a corporation’s use of general treasury funds on independent
expenditures for small non-profit, ideological corporations.
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tionality of many portions of the FECA.33 Most significantly for this
Article, the parties did not even challenge the FECA’s prohibition on
a corporation’s use of general treasury funds for independent expend-
itures because it was an accepted part of campaign finance law.34
The Court first addressed the constitutionality of limits on corpo-
rate spending in the political marketplace two years later in First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.35 Bellotti, however, addressed a question
fundamentally different from the one discussed in this Article. Bellotti
therefore provides little support for the Citizens United Court’s new-
found aversion to speaker-based identity restrictions on electioneering
communications.
First, in Bellotti, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a law
that restricted the ability of corporations to make independent ex-
penditures concerning ballot measures, not candidates.36 While
spending concerning candidates can give rise to corruption or its ap-
pearance, spending regarding ballot measures raises no similar con-
cerns.37 The Court emphasized that “Congress might well be able to
demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption
in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate
elections.”38 The Citizens United majority recklessly ignored this distinc-
33. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6. The Buckley Court, for instance, upheld contribution limits,
disclosure provisions, and presidential public financing provisions. It struck down restric-
tions on individual expenditures limits, including a restriction on the ability of individuals
to make independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, federal candidates.
Id. at 143.
34. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 954 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
35. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
36. Id. at 766. As discussed infra, the Court focused not on the rights of the speaker,
but on the rights of the listener, and found that “direct participation of the people in a
referendum, if anything, increases the need for ‘the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources.’” Id. at 792 n.29 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)).
37. Id. at 790 (“Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for public office. The
risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections simply is not present in
a popular vote on a public issue.” (citation omitted)); Susan Ross, Corporate Speech on Politi-
cal Issues: The First Amendment in Conflict with Democratic Ideals?, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 445, 451
(“Unlike candidates, referenda are not as susceptible to corruption because issues do not
create political ‘debts.’ Corporations’ contributions regarding referenda do not create a
political debt because all voters make the decision, not one individual.”); see also Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 959 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A referen-
dum cannot owe a political debt to a corporation, seek to curry favor with a corporation, or
fear the corporation’s retaliation.”).
38. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26 (emphasis added).
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tion, essentially flouting Bellotti’s precedential value by saying the
Court did not mean what it said.39
Second, Bellotti addressed a law that differentiated between two
types of corporations—those whose business was materially affected by
proposed ballot measures and those whose business was not.40 Specifi-
cally, the law in Bellotti prohibited corporations from making indepen-
dent expenditures about ballot measures unless that measure
materially affected the corporation’s business.41
Third, the law at issue in Bellotti did not provide corporations with
the option of creating and spending money through a PAC.42 Unlike
the restriction addressed in Citizens United, corporations in Bellotti
were completely prohibited from making independent expenditures.
Hence, despite sweeping language in Citizens United disclaiming
speaker-based identity restrictions,43 there is little in Bellotti to dictate
that corporations must be treated as identical to candidates with re-
spect to corporate electioneering communications.44
In 1986, in Federal Election Committee v. Massachusetts Citizens For
Life (“MCFL”), the Court carved an exception to the general prohibi-
tion on a corporation’s use of general treasury funds on independent
expenditures.45 The exception articulated by the Court applied to a
39. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903.
40. Id. at 959 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Bellotti thus
involved a viewpoint-discriminatory statute, created to effect a particular policy outcome.”).
41. The statute at issue provided that:
[N]o business corporation incorporated under the laws of or doing business in
the commonwealth . . . shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute
. . . any money or other valuable thing for the purpose of . . . influencing or
affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materi-
ally affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation. No ques-
tion submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of income, property or
transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, busi-
ness or assets of the corporation.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 768 n.2 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)).
42. Id. at 775 (“Meanwhile, § 8 remains on the books as a complete prohibition of
corporate expenditures related to individual tax referenda, and as a restraining influence
on corporate expenditures concerning other ballot questions.”).
43. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898–904.
44. Id. at 960 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The difference
[between Citizens United and Bellotti] . . . is that the statute at issue in Bellotti smacked of
viewpoint discrimination, targeted one class of corporations, and provided no PAC option;
and the State has a greater interest in regulating independent corporate expenditures on
candidate elections than on referenda, because in a functioning democracy the public
must have faith that its representatives owe their position to the people, not to the corpora-
tions with the deepest pockets.”).
45. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 239 (1986).
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small class of ideological, non-profit corporations.46 In that case a
small, non-profit corporation, Massachusetts Citizens for Life
(“MCFL”), used general treasury funds to distribute a newsletter that
essentially endorsed certain federal candidates.47 The Court found
that MCFL’s expenditure violated the federal prohibition, but that the
restriction could not be constitutionally applied to that non-profit
corporation.48
The MCFL Court adopted a three-pronged test to determine
when a corporation fits within the Court’s exception to the general
prohibition on a corporation’s use of general treasury funds for inde-
pendent expenditures.49 First, MCFL “[w]as formed for the express
purpose of promoting political ideas, and [could not] engage in busi-
ness activities.”50 Put another way, MCFL was an ideological, non-
profit corporation and could not be confused with a business corpora-
tion. Second, MCFL had no shareholders, and those affiliated with the
organization had no economic reason to remain affiliated if they dis-
agreed with its political activity.51 In fact, the Court found that people
who contributed to MCFL did so precisely because they supported its
political activities.52 Hence, MCFL’s speech was directly traceable to
the beliefs of its members, and there were no concerns about the
need to protect dissenting shareholders. Third, MCFL could not act as
a conduit for for-profit corporate electoral spending as it was not es-
tablished by a business corporation and had a policy of not accepting
contributions from such corporations.53 Therefore, electoral speech
by MCFL was protected because it was more akin to speech by a politi-
cal organization than a for-profit corporation.54
Four years later, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the
Court upheld a Michigan State statute modeled after the federal pro-
hibition on a corporation’s use of general treasury funds on indepen-
dent expenditures.55 In that case, the Chamber of Commerce (“the
46. Id. at 263–64. The statute at issue in MCFL, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006) of the FECA,
prohibited corporations from using treasury funds to make an independent expenditure
“in connection” with a federal election.
47. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 243.
48. Id. at 251, 263.
49. Id. at 263–64.
50. Id. at 264.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 260–61.
53. Id. at 264.
54. Id. at 263. Additionally, in its Conclusion, this Article argues that the Court should
follow the lead of lower courts and create a de minimis exception to MCFL.
55. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990).
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Chamber”) did not fall within the exception elucidated in MCFL be-
cause: (1) it was formed for a variety of purposes, including, but not
limited to, promoting political ideas; (2) it had members who would
be reluctant to leave the corporation even if they disagreed with the
corporation’s electoral speech because they economically benefitted
from being a member of the Chamber; and (3) more than seventy-five
percent of the Chamber’s members were business corporations who
could use the Chamber to circumvent the restriction on a corpora-
tion’s use of general treasury funds for independent expenditures.56
Therefore, unlike in MCFL, the corporation’s speech in Austin could
not be traced to its members, and the corporation had members who
might object to the speech but would feel compelled to remain affili-
ated with the corporation.
The Court’s next major decision in this arena came in 2003 in
Federal Election Commission v. McConnell when the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of the BCRA. The McConnell Court upheld the
BCRA’s prohibition on corporations’ use of general treasury funds for
electioneering communications.57 The Court found that the prohibi-
tion served compelling governmental interests and was neither over-
broad nor underinclusive.58
In 2010, in Citizens United, the Court summarily struck down the
same law reviewed by the McConnell Court.59 Plaintiffs, Citizens
United, a non-profit corporation that accepted a small portion of its
funds from for-profit corporations, challenged the federal law as it
applied to its ability to make and distribute a feature-length movie and
accompanying advertisements that were critical of then-presidential
candidate Hilary Clinton. The movie was funded through Citizens
United’s general treasury funds and was considered to be an election-
eering communication.60 The Court transformed the as-applied chal-
lenge into a facial challenge and invalidated the statute.61 Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion focused on the impermissibility of iden-
tity-based speech restrictions and the purported need for the listeners’
56. Id. at 662–65.
57. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003).
58. Id. at 208.
59. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882 (2010).
60. Id. at 889.
61. See id. at 892–93.
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rights—the public’s right to receive corporate electioneering
communications.62
II. The Theories of the First Amendment and of the
Corporate Personality Help to Demonstrate the
Validity of Restrictions on For-Profit
Corporations
The First Amendment electoral speech rights of for-profit corpo-
rations and their individual members are significantly weaker than
those of individuals and non-profit corporations and their individual
members. To demonstrate why this is so, it is important to first ex-
amine the theories and purposes behind the First Amendment and
the theories of the corporate personality.
A. Theories of the Freedom of Speech
There are a few prevalent theories of free speech. Under one the-
ory, free speech allows individuals to seek self-fulfillment, self-realiza-
tion, or self-actualization.63 Under another theory, free speech
promotes a marketplace of ideas where the truth will emerge.64 Fi-
nally, under a third theory, speech facilitates a political debate in
which citizens form views of public officials, which in turn enables
democratic self-government.65 Under each of these theories, restric-
62. See id. at 899 (“[I]t is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters
must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast
their votes.”).
63. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“[T]hose who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make
men free to develop their faculties . . . .”); C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM
OF SPEECH 47–69 (1989); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 4–7 (1966); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 993–94
(2011); Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 197–98 (1998). For a
slightly different view of self-realization, which includes the right to receive information,
see Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to Professor
Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1982).
64. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 19–22 (Alburey Castell ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1947)
(1859); Bhagwat, supra note 63, at 993; see also Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80
IOWA L. REV. 735, 762 (1995) (“Beginning, perhaps, with the Holmes metaphor of a ‘mar-
ketplace of ideas,’ the speech guarantees have been viewed as not only reflecting a central
individual liberty of thought and belief manifested through speech, but also as serving
social and structural purposes in a free democratic society.”).
65. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
24–27 (1948); Bhagwat, supra note 63, at 994; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is
an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255; Ribstein, supra note 2, at 128 (“[F]ree speech is
important to help people make decisions in a democratic society.”); see also Owen M. Fiss,
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tions on for-profit corporate electioneering communications should
be upheld because unlimited for-profit corporate electoral speech
does not serve the goals of free speech.66
One can broadly frame those three theories under a different
paradigm such that the First Amendment is either an individual lib-
erty right focused on the speaker’s interest in self-realization,67 or an
instrumental, structural right focused on the listener and the utility of
speech to society.68 This distinction recognizes that “the First Amend-
ment contains within it two theoretical elements: one concerning indi-
vidual liberty and freedom of thought, and the other concerning the
value of free information and opinion in a democratic and free soci-
Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986) (“We allow people to
speak so others can vote. Speech allows people to vote intelligently and freely, aware of all
the options and in possession of all the relevant information.”); cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (noting that free speech is important to advance
the rights of association). See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory
of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L. REV.
1229, 1232–54 (1991) (analyzing corporate speech in the broader context of collective
speech).
66. Susan W. Dana, Restrictions on Corporate Spending on State Ballot Measure Campaigns:
A Re-Evaluation of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
309, 339 (2000) (“[T]he value assigned to corporate political speech, as opposed to speech
by a natural person, depends on a large extent upon which theory of free speech is
applied.”).
67. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 65, at 1233 (“The . . . right to speak is linked to the
ideas of self-expression and self-realization, both perceived as constituents of, or precondi-
tions for, flourishing personhood.”); id. at 1232 (“[One] point of view considers the law as
primarily committed to the ideal of individual autonomy [under which] . . . the chief
purpose of the law is to provide adequate protection to individual rights, understood as
expression and safeguards of the individual’s autonomy, irrespective of the general societal
consequences of such protection.”).
68. See also id. at 1232 (“[Seen] from the utilitarian perspective, the law is primarily
concerned with the promotion of social welfare.”); id. at 1233 (stating that listeners’ rights
are focused on the availability of, and access to, information and ideas); Bezanson, supra
note 64, at 739 (“The First Amendment should be understood as principally, and specifi-
cally, a protection for individual speech, or speech that reflects an individual’s liberty to
engage in the voluntary and intentional act of expressing his or her own beliefs.”). But see
Fiss, supra note 65, at 1409–10 (“The purpose of free speech is not individual self-actualiza-
tion, but rather the preservation of democracy, and the right of a people, as a people, to
decide what kind of life it wishes to live.”); Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The
Constitutional Bounds of the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 873 (2002) (dis-
cussing Justice White’s dissent in Bellotti and arguing that corporate political speech could
be regulated because it is not “an integral part in the development of ideas, of mental
exploration and of the affirmation of self” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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ety.”69 It is well recognized that the First Amendment protects not
only the right to speak, but also the right to hear.70
Similar to the distinction between the theories that treat the First
Amendment either as a speaker-based right or as a listener-based
right, another argument suggests that there are two reasons why the
freedom of speech is fundamental.71 The first reason is that it is “es-
sential to human respect and dignity,” which means it is a “natural”
right.72 Hence, if speech is a natural right, the focus is on the speaker
to say what she wishes, and the significance of the right lies with its
ability to further an individual’s self-actualization, regardless of its util-
ity to anyone else. The second reason that the freedom of speech is
fundamental is that its existence “is necessary to the functioning of an
ordered society.”73 Under this second rationale, the freedom of
speech is a “policy-based” right, and the focus is on the listener and
the utility of the speech for society.74
While the freedom of speech is a fundamental right under both
theories, the reasons for protecting that right are different.75 Natural
rights “are not subject to traditional cost-benefit analysis” while policy-
based rights are.76 Put another way, it is much easier to restrict the
69. Bezanson, supra note 64 at 761; id. at 763–64 (“Today we see a First Amendment
guarantee premised on two quite distinct theoretical foundations: The first foundation is
based on the freedom of the individual to formulate and express beliefs, and thus rests on
the rights of the speaker, the second is based on the utilitarian value of the speech to society
at large, as a political, functioning entity, and thus rests on the speech and its audience.”).
70. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 806 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(“The self-expression of the communicator is not the only value encompassed by the First
Amendment. One of its functions, often referred to as the right to hear or receive informa-
tion, is to protect the interchange of ideas.”); Dan-Cohen, supra note 65, at 1233 (explain-
ing that the freedom of speech is supported by two sets of interests, those of the speaker
and those of the listener); Dana, supra note 66, at 340 (contrasting the self-actualization
theory of freedom of speech with the “theory [which] states that the public must be able
not only to speak, but also to hear other points of view in order to be able to participate in
the democratic process.”).
71. See, e.g., Matthew A. Melone, Citizens United and Corporate Political Speech: Did the
Supreme Court Enhance Political Discourse or Invite Corruption?, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 29, 80–81
(2010).
72. Id. at 80.
73. Id. at 81.
74. Id.; see also Randall P. Bezanson, No Middle Ground? Reflections on the Citizens
United Decision, 96 IOWA L. REV. 649, 663 (2011) (“The central distinction is between col-
lective speech that can be traced to individuals’ intentions and that which cannot, between
speech protected as [a] function of the individual speaker’s liberty and speech that cannot
be justified in the name of liberty.”).
75. Melone, supra note 71, at 81.
76. Id.
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freedom of speech if it is a policy-based right, as opposed to a natural
right.
Regardless of the theory of the First Amendment that one es-
pouses, unlimited for-profit corporate electoral speech does not pro-
mote either speakers’ or listeners’ First Amendment rights. As
discussed in depth in Part III, the individual rights view of the First
Amendment is inapplicable to corporate speech.77 Corporate speech
simply does not foster self-actualization of the corporate entity itself.78
When the freedom of speech is categorized as a speaker-based natural
right, the focus of the right must therefore be on the free speech
rights of the individual members of a corporation and not a corpora-
tion itself. Put another way, courts must look behind the corporate
form to determine if the speech interests of any natural persons asso-
ciated with the corporation are promoted by corporate speech. How-
ever, as demonstrated infra,79 for-profit corporate electoral speech
does not promote the self-realization or associational rights of the in-
dividual members of the corporation, because for-profit corporate
electoral speech cannot be traced to the speech of its members.
Having determined that for-profit corporate electoral speech
does not promote speakers’ interests, one must next determine
whether such speech promotes listeners’ interests under a view of the
First Amendment that focuses on the rights of listeners and under-
stands the importance of the freedom of speech in its promotion of a
marketplace of ideas and its fostering of democratic self-govern-
ment.80 The answer is again “no.” Even under this view, restrictions on
for-profit electoral speech stand on firm ground. Restrictions on for-
profit electoral speech actually promote the rights of listeners by al-
lowing for a greater diversity of voices to be heard. Restrictions, there-
fore, serve to prevent for-profit corporations from drowning or
crowding out other voices with speech that does not further the First
Amendment rights of the speaker.
77. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Baker, supra note 30, at 652.
78. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804–05 (1978) (White, J., dissent-
ing); see also Baker, supra note 30, at 652 (“Political speech by a corporation, as in Bellotti,
should not be protected, because these communications do not derive from the values or
political commitments of any individuals.”).
79. See infra Part III.A.2. and note 121.
80. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 64, at 761 (arguing that institutional speech “can lay
no legitimate claim to protection under the heading of individual liberty, and thus must be
assessed only in terms of the second element relating to the functional value of speech in a
democratic and free society”).
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B. Conceptions of the Corporate Personality
Over the past decades, much scholarly ink81 has been spilled on
the three main theories of the corporate personality: (1) the artificial
theory, (2) the aggregate theory, and (3) the real entity theory.82 De-
termining one’s theoretical conception of the corporate personality
dictates, at least in part, the amount of First Amendment protection
that should be accorded to a corporate speaker. However, members of
the Court have consistently done a dismal job of explaining to which
theory they are adhering. Some Justices have at times followed more
than one theory in the course of a single opinion.
The artificial theory—also known as the grant theory (because
the state grants powers and rights to the corporation) or the fictional
entity theory—provides that a corporation is a state-creation and pos-
sesses only those rights granted to it by the state and which are neces-
81. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L.
REV. 999, 1001; Linda L. Berger, On Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical
Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949,
960–61 (2007); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83
IOWA L. REV. 995, 1000 (1998); Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corpora-
tion, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95, 95–96 (1995); Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a Gen-
eral Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic
Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1455 (1992); Charles D. Watts Jr., Corporate Legal
Theory Under the First Amendment: Bellotti and Austin, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 325–30
(1991).
82. A fourth theory, entitled the nexus of contracts theory, the contract theory, or
contractarian model, “strips away the corporation’s personification and exposes the net-
work of underlying contracts, thus eliminating any fundamental distinction between a cor-
poration and other types of long-term contracts.” Ribstein, supra note 81, at 96. See generally
William M. Bratton, The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 407 (1989). The corporation as a separate entity disappears, and when analyzing the
constitutionality of speech restrictions, the speech is attributed to the person responsible
for it, typically a manager or director. Ribstein, supra note 81, at 133. Government regula-
tions that limit constitutional rights are analyzed the same way that regulations on other
types of contracts would. The state’s power is limited to its ability to enforce any other type
of private contract. Id. at 109. If a corporation is viewed as a nexus of contracts, it is difficult
to permit regulations on corporate electoral speech. Id. at 136. However, this theory,
whatever its merits, is arguably not easily applicable to ideological non-profit corporations.
Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit
Healthcare Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 34 n.130 (2005) (“Applying
strict contractarian analyses to nonprofit organizations faces intractable problems given
the absence of meaningful bargaining between patrons and agents and the lack of market
for mechanisms to monitor their behavior.”); see, e.g., Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity
Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1454–55, n.247 (1998) (discussing the structure of a
non-profit corporation). It is an economic model under which a corporation is a web of
contracts entered into “among the parties to the firm—shareholders, employees, creditors
and others” for labor, services, capital, and materials. Ribstein, supra note 81, at 113. Hence
this theory may simply be unhelpful to any conception of ideological non-profit
corporations.
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sary to effectuate the purpose of the entity.83 Under this theory,
corporations are artificial entities endowed with state-created benefits
and, in exchange for those benefits, are subject to numerous regula-
tions by the state.84 Corporations, for instance, are given perpetual
life, favorable tax treatment, limited liability, and separation of owner-
ship and control.85
Under the artificial theory, the corporation is not entitled to
heightened First Amendment protection, and restrictions on corpo-
rate speech “would be merely one of the many ways in which the law
sets the parameters of the corporation’s permissible business con-
duct.”86 This theory provides that the value of corporate speech is re-
stricted to the public’s interest in receiving that speech.87 The
importance of corporate speech, therefore, lies with the listener, not
the speaker.88
A number of Justices have, at various times, espoused this theory.
Perhaps the most famous judicial statement embracing the artificial
theory was written in 1819 by Chief Justice John Marshall: “A corpora-
tion is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon
it . . . .”89
Justice Rehnquist adhered to the artificial entity theory in his dis-
sent in Bellotti, explaining that “the mere creation of a corporation
does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural per-
sons . . . .”90 Justice Rehnquist found that corporations possess only
83. Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, supra note 26, at 1244; see also Adam Win-
kler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 863–64
(2007) [hereinafter Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech] (“[I]n
the early decades of the U.S., the states exercised considerable control over corporations
that made them unlikely holders of so-called rights against the government. Corporations
could only be formed by an affirmative grant by the legislature and were required to have a
‘public purpose.’”).
84. Bezanson, supra note 74, at 660 (Corporations are “pervasively regulated at the
state and federal level,” and “[r]equirements pertaining to limited purposes, the structure
of governance, and the rights of shareholders and other officers and boards, all serve to
shape and limit the expressive activity of the organization.” (footnote omitted)); see also
Ross, supra note 37, at 461 (“The corporation receives special privileges from the state, not
available to natural persons, in exchange for regulation.”).
85. See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, supra note 65, at 1242.
86. Baker, supra note 30, at 655.
87. Berger, supra note 81, at 960.
88. See id.
89. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
90. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 824 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). Rehnquist noted that “the liberty protected by [the Fourteenth] Amendment ‘is the
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those rights granted by the state and rights that are “incidental to its
very existence.”91 Justice Rehnquist argued that the right of political
expression was not necessary in order for commercial corporations to
carry out the purposes for which states allowed them to exist.92 Cases
that uphold restrictions on corporate speech tend to rely, in part, on
the artificial entity theory of the corporate personality, which provides
that corporations are not identical to individuals.93
Courts striking down restrictions on corporate speech typically
rely on the second and third theories, which treat corporations as sim-
ilar to individuals. The aggregate theory provides that a corporation is
a collective, or group, of members and shareholders.94 Under this the-
ory, therefore, the corporation gleans its First Amendment rights
from the individual members of the group.95 The best example of this
theory comes in the majority opinion of MCFL.96 There, the Court
treated a small non-profit ideological corporation as akin to a political
association, not a for-profit corporation.97 In that case, the theory was
liberty of natural, not artificial persons.’” Id. at 822 (quoting Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v.
Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906)); see also Ribstein, supra note 2, at 120–21 (“Justice Rehn-
quist argued in his Bellotti dissent that corporate political speech is not protected simply
because this is not one of the privileges states have chosen to confer on their legal cre-
ations.”); Watts, supra note 81, at 363 (“One who views the corporation as purely a creature
of state statute, as does Chief Justice Rehnquist, limits First Amendment values to the pub-
lic interest in a free exchange of ideas. Values of self-expression and self-defense via advo-
cacy would be inapplicable.”).
91. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 824 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) at 636); see also Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, supra note 26, at 1259
(explaining that in contrast to those who espouse the natural entity view, those who adhere
to the artificial entity view, like Rehnquist, “would accept electoral regulation limiting cor-
porate political speech as a condition of doing business”).
92. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 826 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In sum, it was Justice Rehn-
quist’s view that “any particular form of organization upon which the State confers special
privileges or immunities different from those of natural persons would be subject to like
regulation, whether the organization is a labor union, a partnership, a trade association, or
a corporation.” Id. at 826–27.
93. See Berger, supra note 81, at 960.
94. See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1009 (explaining that under the aggregate
theory, a corporation is “ ‘really’ just its ‘members’ and, accordingly, entitled to the same
protection the ‘members’ would have”).
95. Berger, supra note 81, at 961; see also Watts, supra note 81, at 365 (“[A]n aggregate
vision anticipates that the end results of the atomistic transactions within the corporate
structure derive from choices made by shareholders.”).
96. See MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 261 (1986). In addition, Justice Brennan appeared to
espouse this view in his concurrence in Austin, where he stated that corporate general
treasury funds are a shareholder’s money. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 670 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring).
97. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 261; see also Bezanson, supra note 74, at 656 (“It was not the
Constitution’s purpose to protect corporations, as opposed to political organizations of
like-minded people, from the government.”).
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applicable because the corporation’s speech was directly traceable to
its members who associated with the corporation specifically to sup-
port a set of political ideas.
Justice Scalia at times relies on the aggregate conception of the
corporation.98 The rationale behind Justice Scalia’s opinions often
rests on the expressive nature of corporations as merely aggregations
of individuals.99 For instance, Justice Scalia rightly declared in a sepa-
rate opinion in McConnell that “[t]he freedom to associate with others
for the dissemination of ideas—not just by singing or speaking in uni-
son, but by pooling financial resources for expressive purposes—is part
of the freedom of speech.”100 But of course, as discussed in depth in-
fra, shareholders of for-profit corporations do not join together for
expressive purposes.101 Similarly, in his concurrence in Citizens United,
Justice Scalia compared corporate speech to speech by political par-
ties, saying that the latter is the speech “of many individual Americans,
who have associated in a common cause . . . .”102 Justice Scalia’s point,
while inapplicable to for-profit corporate electoral speech, supports
the speech rights of certain ideological non-profit corporations under
the aggregate entity theory.
The aggregate theory simply cannot be used to protect for-profit
corporate electoral speech. Protecting speech rights under this theory
would necessitate erroneously treating a for-profit corporation like a
group of likeminded individuals joined together to further political or
ideological objectives, rather than an array of shareholders joined to-
gether for the economic purpose of maximizing their wealth. As dis-
cussed in Part III.A.2, the rights of for-profit shareholders are not
promoted by for-profit corporate electoral speech, and for-profit polit-
ical speech cannot be traced to the views of its shareholders.
98. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 81, at 362.
99. Professor Bezanson argues that Justice Scalia’s:
[P]oint seems to be that corporations, like other expressive groups, can be fully
protected First Amendment speakers, at least as long as their speech qualifies as
speaking because of the representativeness of the speech to the views and inten-
tions of the owners or members. If not, we might surmise, their inanimate (arti-
factual) “speech” might be protected, but in a different fashion.
Bezanson, supra note 74, at 665.
100. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 255 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added); see also Gary M. Bishop, Corporate Speech and the Right
of Response in the Commercial Free Zone, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1149, 1189 (2008) (discussing Jus-
tice Scalia’s dissent in McConnell).
101. See infra Part III.A.2.
102. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); Melone,
supra note 71, at 84.
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The real or natural entity view provides that a corporation is
“akin to a natural individual with inherent rights, such as freedom of
speech . . . .”103 This view, therefore, dictates that corporate “speech is
attributed to the corporate entity rather than to individuals.”104 Under
this theory, a corporation is a discrete entity controlled by its manag-
ers and is separate from the state and from the individual members of
the corporation.105 The Court has at times adopted the real entity the-
ory. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Bellotti, implicitly ad-
hered to the natural entity view by imbuing corporations with political
speech rights.106
This Article specifically rejects the natural or real entity concep-
tion of corporations in the context of for-profit corporate electoral
speech. As discussed in Part III.A, corporations lack natural rights.
This is in part why this Article rejects the real entity view of the corpo-
ration in this context and argues that corporate speech is entitled to
less protection than individual speech. Corporate speech is, by defini-
tion, derivative speech, or speech-by-proxy.107 Quite obviously, a cor-
porate entity cannot speak for itself. A corporation speaks when
someone is hired to communicate for it. There will always be an indi-
vidual or group of individuals deciding when and how to speak on
behalf of the corporation in the political marketplace.108 However,
the human who is speaking is acting as an agent, not for that person’s
103. Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, supra note 26, at 1244. Under this view,
“corporations enjoy full First Amendment speech protections and it would be unconstitu-
tional for a state to require a corporation to forfeit those rights to gain the state-conferred
benefits that come with incorporation.” Id. at 1259.
104. Ribstein, supra note 81, at 129.
105. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1010 (explaining that under this theory, “the
corporate person [is] a rights-bearing individual with its own interests and goals”); see also
Ribstein, supra note 81, at 129 (explaining that this theory is also known as the corporate
person theory); Berger, supra note 81, at 961; Watts, supra note 81, at 327–28 (“The natural
entity model reflected the general attitude that neither states nor shareholders could effec-
tively check management’s power over these massive entities.”).
106. Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, supra note 26, at 1258 (stating that Justice
Powell’s opinion “granted the corporation broad speech protection as if it were a natural
rights holder, but carefully avoided giving explicit recognition of the natural entity view”);
see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 81, at 1032.
107. Frances R. Hill, Corporate Political Speech and the Balance of Powers: A New Framework
for Campaign Finance Jurisprudence in Wisconsin Right to Life, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
267, 295 (2008) (explaining that “[i]f the corporate entity’s rights are derivative, then the
rights of the members or contributors within the corporate entity are central issues for a
political speech framework”); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
108. See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1014 (“[A] corporation is not obviously the
sort of thing that can speak: some human must speak on its behalf . . . .”).
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own self-actualization.109 Hence, corporate speech is one step re-
moved from the speech of a living, breathing human and is likely un-
related to the liberty interests of the individual behind the speech.
Of course, no single conception of the corporation is complete or
exclusive, and corporations, to some extent, fall within each of these
theories.110 Indeed, the Justices have alternatively and inconsistently
applied each of these theories in various opinions dealing with the
constitutionality of restrictions on corporate electoral speech. Simply
put, this Article argues that for-profit corporate electoral speech
should not be protected.111
In sum, the artificial entity theory lends support to the argument
that for-profit electoral speech should be restricted because the gov-
ernment may subject corporations to numerous regulations in ex-
change for endowing those entities with benefits, and such speech is
not necessary to effectuate the purposes for which the business corpo-
rations were created. The aggregate theory similarly supports the re-
striction of for-profit electoral speech because such speech is not
traceable to its members. This theory also lends support for the pro-
tection of certain non-profit electoral speech where the corporation
functions like a political association, and its speech is traceable to that
of its members. This Article rejects the artificial entity theory in the
context of corporate electoral speech. Such speech is by definition
derivative speech, which may not represent the views of the individu-
als speaking through the corporate form.
109. See, e.g., id. at 1056 (“In the corporate context, it should be uncontroversial that
ordinarily corporate spokespeople speak on behalf of the corporation, rather than them-
selves, and accordingly that the autonomy at issue is the corporation’s, not their own.”).
110. Hill, supra note 107, at 295 (explaining that these three theories of corporations
follow the “three broad patterns for analyzing the relationship between an organization
and its members, or, if one prefers, between members of their organization: (I) [sic] both
the members and the corporate entity might be treated as having independent rights
under the First Amendment; (ii) corporate entities might be treated as deriving First
Amendment rights from their members; or (iii) members might be treated as having
waived certain of their First Amendment rights once they join or transfer funds to a corpo-
rate entity”).
111. As Justice Stevens explained in his dissent in Citizens United, “[i]t is not necessary
to agree on a precise theory of the corporation to agree that corporations differ from
natural persons in fundamental ways, and that a legislature might therefore need to regu-
late them differently if it is human welfare that is the object of its concern.” Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 972 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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III. Unrestricted For-Profit Corporate Electoral Speech Does
Not Promote the First Amendment Interests of
Speakers and Listeners
The following explains that, quite obviously, a corporation itself
lacks natural speech rights, and that the speech and associational
rights of members of a for-profit corporation are not promoted by
unrestricted for-profit corporate electoral speech. In addition, the
rights of listeners and non-spending speakers are similarly not pro-
moted by unrestricted for-profit corporate electoral speech. Quite the
opposite: restrictions on such speech actually promote the rights of
listeners and non-spending speakers.
A. Corporations Lack Self-Expressive Rights, and the Self-
Expressive Rights of Individual Members of For-Profit
Corporations Are Not Furthered by Corporate
Electoral Speech
There are two self-realization interests at issue regarding restric-
tions on corporate electioneering communications. First, there are
the rights of the corporation itself. Second, there are the rights of the
individual members of the corporation. In both cases, restrictions on
for-profit corporate political spending do not burden self-expressive
rights. Hence, restrictions on for-profit corporate speech do not bur-
den the associational rights of members of for-profit corporations.
1. Corporate Electoral Speech Does Not Further a Corporation’s
Self-Expressive Rights Because Corporations Themselves
Lack Self-Realization Rights
[A] corporation cannot have “natural rights.” . . . [A] corporation
is neither spawned by a creator or deity nor entitled to rights by
virtue of its humanity.112
Corporations lack natural rights and “have no dignity interest to
preserve and no character to develop. Nor do corporations participate
in political debate to sharpen their ‘faculties for thought.’”113 Corpo-
rations themselves lack self-actualization or self-expressive rights, as
112. Melone, supra note 71, at 82.
113. Winkler, supra note 63, at 198. Professor Winkler has noted that “the constitutive
conception seems to be particularly dependent upon the human characteristics of speak-
ers: their dignity and rational faculties.” Id. at 198; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 950,
972 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that corporations
have “no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires” and that when “[the
Framers] constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was the
free speech of individual Americans that they had in mind”).
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they have no capacity for self-realization.114 The freedom of speech,
which flows directly from the freedom of thought, is “the quintessen-
tial human characteristic.”115
As discussed infra, corporate electoral speech rights are derivative
rights based on the rights of the individual members of the corpora-
tion to speak and associate, and of the public to hear that speech.116
However, as this Article explains, neither the rights of individual
members of for-profit corporations nor the rights of listeners are fur-
thered by for-profit corporate electoral speech. Corporate speech is
therefore “furthest from the core of political expression . . . .”117 Thus,
corporate speech can be “subject to restrictions to which individual
expression is not.”118 While the First Amendment may protect both
the speaker and the listener, when for-profit corporations engage in
political speech, the corporate entity is not a speaker entitled to full
First Amendment protection.119
114. Corporate electoral speech does not further “the use of communication as a
means of self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment.” First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804, 806 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“In the case of corporate
political activities, we are not at all concerned with the self-expression of the communica-
tor.”); see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 65, at 1244 (explaining that corporate speech—which
the author describes as utilitarian organizational speech—does not implicate “[t]he values
of self-expression and self-realization that normally underlie the speaker’s original first
amendment right”); Dana, supra note 66, at 339–40 (“[T]he ‘self-realization’ theory that
the First Amendment’s purpose is to enhance an individual’s ability to develop her own
personal powers and abilities, tends not to value corporate speech highly because the cor-
poration does not exist as an entity that can be ‘self-realized.’” (footnote omitted)); Ross,
supra note 37, at 460.
115. Melone, supra note 71, at 81 (emphasis added).
116. See infra Part III.A.2.
117. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 947 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 n.8 (2003)). This same
idea explains why contributions are entitled to less First Amendment protection than ex-
penditures. Contributions only become speech when spent by the person or entity to
whom the contribution is given. An analogy can be made to corporate electoral speech,
which is similarly one step removed from a speaker. See Bezanson, supra note 64, at 746.
118. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804 (White, J., dissenting); see also Baker, supra note 30, at 654
(“[T]hat first amendment protection results when the individual chooses this speech as an
aspect of self-realization does not imply that the government may not regulate or ban the
enterprise’s identical message.”).
119. See Bezanson, supra note 64, at 756 (“[I]nstitutions cannot speak for purposes of
the First Amendment. They may produce speech that is relevant to First Amendment poli-
cies, but its constitutional protection would rest on considerations other than liberty or indi-
vidual freedom.”).
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2. For-Profit Corporate Electoral Speech Does Not Further the
Self-Expressive or Associational Rights of Individual
Members of the Corporation
Corporate speech serves to promote and amplify the First
Amendment rights of shareholders, directors, and management only
when that speech can be traced to the liberty interests of those indi-
viduals.120 This Article draws a distinction between for-profit and non-
profit corporations, arguing that for-profit corporate electoral speech
does not promote the First Amendment rights of individuals associ-
ated with those corporations,121 and that such speech poses threats to
electoral and political systems.122 The opposite is often true of non-
profit corporate speech, which can promote the speech rights of those
associated with the organization, and which does not pose similar
threats to the integrity of the electoral and political systems.
The concept of traceability—which determines whether corpo-
rate speech can be traced to its individual members—is key to demon-
strating why restrictions on for-profit corporate electioneering
communications should be permissible, while restrictions on the same
speech by many non-profit corporations should not be acceptable. If a
corporation’s speech can be traced to its individual members, then
the speech and associational rights of those members are furthered by
the corporation’s speech—or phrased in the negative, are burdened
by restrictions on the corporation’s speech.123 In determining tracea-
bility, it is therefore important to look at the reason why individuals
chose to associate with a corporation.
120. Bezanson, supra note 74, at 662–63.
121. In analyzing cases dealing with the right of associations to choose whom they se-
lected as members, Justice O’Connor suggested distinguishing between commercial as-
sociations (which should be entitled to limited First Amendment protection) and
expressive associations (which would be entitled to far more protection). See generally Rob-
erts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S.
1 (1988). This logic applies with equal force to corporate electoral speech. See Hill, supra
note 107, at 295 (“[B]usiness corporations might be treated differently than membership
organizations established for purposes of policy advocacy or political committees organ-
ized for explicit purposes of contesting candidate elections.”).
122. James Weinstein, Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment: An Introduction,
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1064 (2002) (stating that the Court’s cases demonstrate a consistent
theme: “[I]t is not the corporate form that matters but the dangers to the political process
presented by business corporations given special privileges by state law to amass wealth,
dangers that are not presented by voluntary non-profit corporations organized for political
purposes.”).
123. Melone, supra note 71, at 85; see also Bezanson, supra note 64, at 777–81 (discuss-
ing the importance of traceability to the protection of speech, particularly with respect to
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Austin and MCFL).
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The common cause of shareholders in for-profit corporations is
to create wealth, not to disseminate political ideas.124 Shareholders
buy an ownership interest in corporations for commercial, not expres-
sive purposes.125 Shareholders “do not share a common set of political
or social views, and they certainly have not invested their money for
the purpose of advancing political or social causes or in an enterprise
engaged in the business of disseminating news and opinion.”126 A for-
profit corporation is not akin to other expressive or political associa-
tions like political parties or interest groups that allow likeminded in-
dividuals to join together for a common ideological purpose. Rather,
it is “a pot of money driven to grow, by good means or bad.”127
When for-profit corporations make electioneering communica-
tions, they do so not to promote the views of an ideologically unified
group, but to increase the value of shares regardless of the political,
ideological, or social views of its shareholders.128 A corporation’s elec-
toral speech might actually conflict with the political and ideological
views of its shareholders and the individuals causing the message to be
disseminated.129 The fact that the issue of shareholder protection ex-
ists “belies the notion that corporate political speech is a manifesta-
124. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 805 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
125. Melone, supra note 71, at 84; see Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1033 (“[Corpora-
tions] are legally required to represent not a group of people but a legally defined set of
interests—the interests of a fictional creature called a shareholder that has no associations,
economic incentives or political views other than a desire to profit from its connection with
this particular corporation.”).
126. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 805 (White, J., dissenting).
127. Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1054.
128. This is particularly true regarding corporations with thousands of shareholders or
publicly traded corporations. First, the identities of shareholders of such corporations
changes by the second. Second, many individuals are removed from ownership because
they own stock through a mutual fund or pension program. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130
S. Ct. 876, 974 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The struc-
ture of a business corporation . . . draws a line between the corporation’s economic inter-
ests and the political preferences of the individuals associated with the corporation; the
corporation must engage the electoral process with the aim ‘to enhance the profitability of
the company, no matter how persuasive the arguments for a broader of conflicting set of
priorities . . . .’” (citations omitted)).
129. Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1051–52 (explaining that corporations “are re-
quired to use the money available to them to promote share values, even when the inter-
ests of society, or the owners of shares, are to the contrary”); see also Baker, supra note 30, at
653 (“[T]he market mechanism, by forcing the enterprise to make the most efficient
(profit-maximizing) decisions, dictates the content of the enterprise’s speech, and thus
separates the decision concerning speech content from the value decisions of either the
employees or the owners of the enterprise.”).
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tion of the views of various individuals joined together in a common
cause.”130
Hence, for-profit corporate speech cannot be traced to share-
holders in a corporation.131 When for-profit corporations engage in
electoral speech, it is not even entirely clear who the individual be-
hind a corporate message is.132 It is not the customers or sharehold-
ers, who have little say in the daily operations of a corporation, and
who seek only to maximize their profits.133 It is more likely the officers
or directors who have a fiduciary duty not to use corporate funds for
130. Melone, supra note 71, at 86; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 979 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he problem of dissenting shareholders
shows that even if electioneering expenditures can advance the political views of some
members of a corporation, they will often compromise the views of others.”).
131. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 807 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(“Ideas which are not a product of individual choice are entitled to less First Amendment
protection.”); Baker, supra note 30, at 654; Bezanson, supra note 74, at 666; see Karl J.
Sandstrom & Janis Crum, Is the Internet a Safe Haven for Corporate Political Speech?: Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce in the Shadow of Reno v. ACLU, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
193, 198 (2000) (“[G]overnment may be justified in regulating speech intermediaries
when they depart from the function of reflecting and transmitting norms ultimately cho-
sen by individuals.”).
132. See generally Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1004 (“[I]n the publicly traded corpora-
tion, none of the human actors involved is in a position to control the speech. None of
them is likely to view it as his or her own speech. As a result, the speech is not properly
understood as made on behalf of any one of them. Instead, corporate speech is better
understood as the expenditure of money in accordance with dictates of the law and the
market on behalf of the imaginary interests of a legal fiction . . . .”); see also Ribstein, supra
note 2, at 125 (“[C]orporate speech should be constitutionally protected only to the extent
necessary to protect the rights of individuals connected with the corporation . . . . In pub-
licly held corporations, however, there is some question as to who the speakers are, and
therefore who, if anyone, should be protected by the First Amendment.”).
133. Adam Winkler has explained that “[w]hen a ‘corporation’ speaks, it is not the
owners of the corporation (shareholders) who do so, it is those who exercise control of the
corporation’s assets (management).” Winkler, supra note 63, at 165. Winkler further stated
that:
[S]hareholders have little control over the use of their money once it is invested.
Corporate managers make decisions on what political issues to support, function-
ally immunized from shareholder scrutiny by the business judgment rule and the
structure of corporate democracy. The consequence is that corporate political
speech reflects the judgments of corporate officers, and not necessarily the peo-
ple whose money funds the speech.
Id. at 199–200; see also Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1003, 1007–08 (stating that “the views
of the individuals who own [a corporation’s] securities, the human beings behind the
shares, are largely irrelevant to the positions a properly run corporation takes” and that
“modern corporate law, by locating the center of corporate authority in a board of direc-
tors bound to act in the best interests of the corporation, makes clear that the shareholders
. . . have no right to run the corporation or determine its goals”).
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personal benefit.134 Hence, while it is not clear who speaks when a for-
profit corporation makes electioneering communications, it is clear
that speaking through the corporate form does not foster the self-ex-
pressive rights of whoever is actually behind a corporation’s mes-
sage.135 Indeed, a corporation’s electoral message could actually
conflict with an individual’s personal beliefs.
Because of this lack of traceability, for-profit corporate electoral
speech—in addition to failing to promote the speech rights of individ-
ual members of corporations—fails to bolster the associational rights
of those members.136 “While individuals might join together to exer-
cise their speech rights, business corporations . . . [do] not . . .
facilitat[e] such associational or expressive ends.”137 For-profit corpo-
rations “are not catalysts for self-realization, they are vehicles for profit
maximization”138 because shareholders and directors or managers do
not become affiliated with a for-profit corporation in order to advance
ideological, social, or political beliefs.139
In contrast to for-profit corporate electoral speech, when certain
non-profit corporations make electioneering communications, it is
134. Daniel Greenwood has argued that “corporate positions are determined by fiduci-
aries who are obligated both to set aside their own views and to ignore the actual views and
interests of the other people involved in the corporation.” See Greenwood, supra note 81, at
1033. Greenwood has also explained that “[t]he actual speakers—the lobbyists, advertising
copy writers, lawyers, executives, and publicists who speak on behalf of the corporation—
speak as agents, not on their own behalf.” Id. at 1038. Therefore, Greenwood has averred
that “[b]ecause the people behind the shares have no practical authority to vary the single
goal on behalf of which corporate managers must act, corporate speakers are agents an-
swerable to a principle, not a principal.” Id. at 1042.
135. Id. at 1002 (stating that corporate speech “does not reflect the views of sharehold-
ers, nor, if management is acting in good faith, those of managers or other corporate
agents”).
136. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advo-
cacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association . . . .”).
137. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 950 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
138. Winkler, supra note 63, at 199 (“It is hardly clear that corporate political speech
serves any self-realization goals of the individuals who have chosen to associate with the
corporate entity. Shareholders invest in business corporations to garner a profit and grow
their portfolio.”); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Take away the ability to use general treasury funds for some of
those ads, and no one’s autonomy, dignity, or political equality has been impinged upon in
the least.”); Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1056 (“This individualist First Amendment value
is simply inapplicable to corporate speech on behalf of the interest of the corporation itself
or of its fictional shareholders: no individual’s sphere of action is protected when corpo-
rate management is directed to spend corporate funds on behalf of a singular corporate
goal [of profit-maximization] that ignores all competing considerations.”).
139. Melone, supra note 71, at 85.
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often fair to link the corporation’s speech to the individual members
of the corporate entity. Some non-profit corporations are “formed for
the express purpose of advancing certain ideological causes shared by
all their members . . . . Under such circumstances, association in a
corporate form may be viewed as merely a means of achieving effec-
tive self-expression.”140 Individuals choose to become affiliated with
these expressive non-profit organizations not for economic motives,
but because they believe in the corporation’s ideological, political, or
social message.141 Therefore, speech by these non-profit corporations
should be protected “based on a concern for the individual members’
original expressive rights and on the recognition that such organiza-
tions aid the exercise of those individual expressive rights.”142
Indeed, as Professor Bezanson explains,143 there is a line of cases
in which:
[T]he Court treated organizational and corporate campaign and
political expression identically to individual speech because the
specific organizations were ideological in ways that permitted trac-
ing their expression to the members rather than the organization;
business corporations would generally not enjoy full First Amend-
ment protection, but instead are subject to a lower standard of pro-
tection based on the value and accuracy of the speech . . . .144
Some have argued that for-profit corporate electoral speech does
generally reflect the views of shareholders. Specifically, the argument
is that if shareholders want nothing but to maximize their profits, and
management is under a fiduciary duty to serve the interests of share-
140. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 805 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(noting the need to differentiate corporations formed for ideological reasons shared by its
members from for-profit corporations); see also Ige Omotayo Bolodeoku, Corporate Speech in
a Democracy: What Can Nigeria Learn from Abroad?, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 61, 95–96
(2005) (discussing Justice White’s skepticism about whether for-profit communications
“were an integral part of the development of ideas, of mental exploration, and of affirma-
tion of self, protected by the First Amendment” and agreeing that ideological corporations
could serve as “vehicles for achieving self-expression”).
141. Winkler, supra note 63, at 163.
142. Dan-Cohen, supra note 65, at 1248 (emphasis omitted).
143. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court’s decision in MCFL rested, at
least in part, on the fact that the speech could be traced to the individual members of the
corporation, who used the corporation to disseminate their speech. See Bezanson, supra
note 64, at 748.
144. Bezanson, supra note 74, at 656 (emphasis added); see also Dan-Cohen, supra note
65, at 1248 (“Many organizations, unlike business corporations, are established for the
specific purpose of engaging in speech, which figures prominently among their organiza-
tional goals. By joining such organizations, the individual members delegate their active
speech rights respecting specific issues to the organization and acquiesce to having their
views represented by the organization.”).
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holders, then electoral spending promotes at least the economic inter-
ests of shareholders, and corporate speech can be traced to individual
shareholders. However, the existence of dissenting shareholders con-
tradicts this argument. Additionally, a shareholder’s generalized de-
sire to maximize share values is not akin to a non-profit corporation
member’s specific desire to advocate and promote a particular politi-
cal or ideological perspective. Those two interests, one commercial
and economic, and one political and ideological (premised on an in-
dividual liberty interest in self-realization), should not be entitled to
the same level of First Amendment protection when the individuals
funding the speech are speaking through the corporate form.
As Justice White explained in his dissent in Bellotti:
Although it is arguable that corporations make . . . expenditures
because their managers believe that it is in the corporations’ eco-
nomic interest to do so, there is no basis whatsoever for concluding
that these views are expressive of the heterogeneous beliefs of their
shareholders whose convictions on many political issues are un-
doubtedly shaped by considerations other than a desire to endorse
any electoral or ideological cause which would tend to increase the
value of a particular corporate investment.145
Because a corporation itself lacks self-expressive rights, restric-
tions on the speech of a corporation become problematic under the
First Amendment only if they hinder or restrict an individual’s self-
expressive or associational rights.146 Restrictions on for-profit corpo-
rate electoral speech do neither, while restrictions on non-profit cor-
porate electoral speech can do both. This is because for-profit
electoral speech, in contrast to some non-profit electoral speech, can-
not be traced to individual members of a corporation.
B. Restrictions on For-Profit Corporate Electoral Speech Promote
First Amendment Rights
Corporate political speech under campaign law is protected only to
the extent that it is useful or valuable to the voters. Corporate polit-
ical speech protection is more limited than that accorded individ-
ual speech because it can’t rely on democratic liberty and free will
for its production.147
As discussed supra, corporations cannot themselves speak. There-
fore, one must look to the individual members of corporations to see
whether a speaker’s liberty rights are implicated by corporate speech.
When for-profit corporations fund electoral speech, that speech is not
145. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 806 (White, J., dissenting).
146. Melone, supra note 71, at 85.
147. See Bezanson, supra note 74, at 659.
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traceable to individual members of the corporations. There is not an
individual whose liberty interest is at issue, except the liberty interest
of dissenting shareholders, who are compelled to speak.
But the forgoing discussion does not end the analysis. It has long
been accepted that the First Amendment protects both the right to
speak and the right to listen.148 When a corporation’s speech does not
represent the views of an ideologically unified group of members—as
is the case with for-profit corporate electoral speech—the level of pro-
tection accorded to the speech depends solely on the speech’s utility
to society at large.149 The forgoing focuses on for-profit corporate
electoral speech, the protection of which hinges only on the rights of
listeners, not speakers.
1. The Supreme Court has Erroneously Focused on the Rights of
Listeners to Hear Corporate Speech
The Court has slung the weight of its reasoning in cases protect-
ing corporate electoral speech on the right to hear.150 In Bellotti, the
first case to address and strike down restrictions on corporate political
spending, the Court quickly acknowledged that self-expressive rights
were not implicated in that case,151 and the majority hung its hat
148. See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, supra note 65, at 1233.
149. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 30, at 657 (explaining that because the Court accepts
that corporate speech “has little relation to the sponsor’s self-realization or liberty or indi-
vidual choice,” the Court focuses on the listener and justifies protecting corporate speech
“on classic marketplace-of-ideas reasoning”); see also Bezanson, supra note 64, at 740 (ex-
plaining that the protection of what the author terms “institutional speech” “depends on
the value of the speech itself as communicated to various audiences, and relates to the
broader interests of the system of expression in our free and democratic society, not to the
freedom of the institution that created and disseminated the speech”); Bezanson, supra
note 74, at 663 (noting that the level of protection accorded to corporate electoral speech
depends on: “(1) the speech’s need for protection in the system of expression (i.e., is it a
view or information that will otherwise not be expressed in public discussion?); (2) its
value; and (3) its consequences for public debate and discussion in the polity”); Ribstein,
supra note 2, at 128–29 (explaining that the “nonspeaker-based theories of First Amend-
ment protection would support constitutional protection for corporate speech apart from
protection of self-expression by individuals connected with the corporation”); Winkler, Cor-
porate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, supra note 83, at 867 (“[T]o the extent
the Court has recognized First Amendment rights of corporations, corporate personhood
was not central to those decisions. The Court was more inclined to rest the argument for
corporate speech on the rights of listeners, for whom the underlying information would be
useful.”).
150. This is sometimes referred to as “the right to listen.” See Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. &
Kenneth D. Karpay, Corporate Political Free Speech: 2 U.S.C. §441b and the Superior Rights of
Natural Persons, 14 PAC. L. J. 209, 223 (1983).
151. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978) (emphasizing
that “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
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solely on listeners’ rights.152 The Bellotti Court famously stated “[t]he
inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corpo-
ration, association, union, or individual.”153
Justice Kennedy, whose dissent in Austin formed the basis of his
majority opinion in Citizens United, similarly found that the listeners’
interest dictated the protection of corporate electoral speech. In Aus-
tin, Justice Kennedy argued that the issue before the Court involved
“society’s interest in free and informed discussion on political issues, a
discourse vital to the capacity for self-government.”154 In Citizens
United, now writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy found that the
public has the right to hear corporate electoral speech because
“[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means
to hold officials accountable to the people.”155
government” (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964))). And with that
the Court elevated the rights of listeners over the rights of speakers.
152. The Bellotti majority began its analysis of the First Amendment issue by citing
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940), where the Court held: “Freedom of dis-
cussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with
the exigencies of their period.” A few paragraphs later, the majority cited Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214 (1966), for support. There the Court held that “there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discus-
sion of governmental affairs.” Id. at 218. Winkler explained that Bellotti “rests on a First
Amendment theory of hearers’ rights, rather than speakers’ rights.” Winkler, supra note 63
at 196. Winkler has called the self-realization theory of the First Amendment “the main
theoretical competitor to Bellotti.” Id.; see also id. at 134–35 (explaining that Bellotti “focused
on the informational needs of recipients of corporate speech and extended corporate
speech rights accordingly”); Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and
Disclaimer for Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622, 655
(2010) (“[T]he purpose of allowing corporations to speak, under Bellotti’s rationale, is to
benefit the listeners rather than to preserve a liberty intrinsic to the corporations
themselves.”).
153. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (emphasis added). The Court stated that commercial
speech cases merely demonstrate that “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of
the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the
stock of information from which members of the public may draw.” Id. at 783. The Court
misses the central point, however, which is that corporate electoral speech is not commer-
cial speech.
154. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 698 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Kennedy argued that the fact that the speech at issue came from the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, and not an individual, “detracts not a scintilla from its validity, its
persuasiveness, or its contribution to political dialogue.” Id. at 706.
155. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. Justice Kennedy continued that “[t]he right of
citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a pre-
condition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.” Id. Justice
Kennedy averred that the government cannot “deprive the public of the right and privilege
to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.” Id. at 899.
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Justice Kennedy’s focus on the importance of unrestricted corpo-
rate electoral speech to self-government hinges on his belief that such
communications provide important information for voters. Justice
Kennedy found that “voters must be free to obtain information from
diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes,”156 and
that restrictions on corporate electoral speech “prevent[ ] [corpora-
tion’s] voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising
voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”157
As Justice Stevens wrote in dissent, Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Citizens United “place[d] primary emphasis not on the cor-
poration’s right to electioneer, but rather on the listener’s interest in
hearing what every possible speaker may have to say.”158 Justice Ken-
nedy has been the most powerful and consistent voice on the Court
advocating for protection of corporate electoral speech hinged upon
a listener-based theory of the First Amendment. Under Justice Ken-
nedy’s view, corporate electoral speech promotes an open market-
place of ideas and democratic self-government.159
The majorities in Bellotti and Citizens United (and dissent in Aus-
tin) simply got it wrong when they hooked their dubious rationales to
the listeners’ interest. The instrumental, policy-based interests of pro-
moting the marketplace of ideas and democratic self-government is
not facilitated by unrestricted corporate electoral speech. Un-
restricted corporate electoral speech not falling within the MCFL ex-
ception actually harms those interests.
2. Restrictions on For-Profit Corporate Electoral Speech Promote
the Rights of Listeners and Non-Spending Speakers
While a number of justices—most prominently Justice Powell in
Bellotti and Justice Kennedy in Austin and Citizens United—have argued
in favor of unrestricted corporate electoral speech based on an instru-
mental notion of the First Amendment, their rationale is unpersua-
156. Id.
157. Id. at 906. Justice Kennedy made similar statements, all focused on the listeners’
rights, throughout the Citizens United opinion: “The purpose and effect of this law is to
prevent corporations, including small and nonprofit corporations, from presenting both
facts and opinions to the public.” Id. “[I]nformative voices should not have to circumvent
onerous restrictions to exercise their First Amendment rights.” Id. at 912. If the restriction
were allowed to stand, “[s]peech would be suppressed in the realm where its necessity is
most evident: in the public dialogue preceding a real election.” Id. at 917.
158. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 973 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
159. Id. at 906 (majority opinion).
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sive. When the speakers are corporations and when the Court’s
rationale rests entirely on the rights of listeners, one must determine
if listeners’ rights are actually harmed by restrictions.160 Listeners will
not be injured if for-profit corporate electoral speech is limited—far
from it, restrictions promote the rights of listeners and non-spending
speakers.
a. Restrictions on Corporate Speech Do Not Harm Listeners’
Rights
When corporate electoral speech is restricted, the listener is not
deprived of speech because all that is reduced is the volume, not the
content, of speech.161 This is true for two reasons. First, each individ-
ual member of a corporation, whether that corporation is a Fortune
500 or a small closed corporation, is free to speak as much as she
wants without the use of the corporate form.162 Electioneering com-
munications by individuals are unlimited.163 A restriction on corpo-
rate electoral speech “may affect the way in which individuals
disseminate certain messages through the corporate form, but it does
not prevent anyone from speaking in his or her own voice.”164
160. Id. at 977 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 807 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he restriction of corporate speech concerned with political matters impinges much
less severely upon the availability of ideas to the general public than do restrictions upon
individual speech.”); id. at 821 (noting that restrictions on corporate electoral speech “are
sufficient to justify any incremental curtailment in the volume of expression” (emphasis
added)); id. at 828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The free flow of information is in no way
diminished by the [State’s] decision to permit the operation of business corporations with
limited rights of political expression.”).
162. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 943 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“Like all other natural persons, every shareholder of every corporation remains en-
tirely free under Austin and McConnell to do however much electioneering she pleases
outside of the corporate form.”); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 807 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that when for-profit corporate spending is restricted, “it is unlikely that any significant
communication would be lost by such a prohibition. [Shareholders, employees, and cus-
tomers] would remain perfectly free to communicate any ideas which could be conveyed
by means of the corporate form.”); id. at 828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“All natural per-
sons, who owe their existence to a higher sovereign than the [State], remain as free as
before to engage in political activity.”); see also Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1062, 1065
(explaining that if corporate electoral speech is restricted “all the legitimate participants in
the political debate remain able to speak freely” and “[t]o the extent that the corporation
is promoting ideas held by anyone, those ideas are fully protected when they emerge from
protected speakers”).
163. In addition, spending by MCFL corporations were similarly unlimited under Citi-
zens United. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882.
164. Id. at 972 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-2\SAN202.txt unknown Seq: 35 16-FEB-12 12:02
Fall 2011] WE THE CORPORATIONS? 341
Second, the corporate entity itself can speak through a PAC.165
This option gives listeners ample opportunity to hear corporate elec-
toral speech while protecting the rights of dissenting shareholders
and non-spending speakers.166 When corporate speech is limited lis-
teners are still privy to corporate communications, just perhaps at a
lower decibel level.
b. Restrictions on Corporate Electoral Spending Prevents
Corporations from Flooding the Marketplace and
Drowning Out Other Voices
Restrictions on corporate electoral speech, which do nothing but
reduce the volume of speech, actually promote listeners’ rights.
Though an initially appealing thought, at least in the abstract, neither
the ability to speak nor the ability to listen is infinite. When a speaker
“adds something to the public debate, something is also taken away.
What is said determines what is not said.”167 Indeed, “in politics, scar-
city is the rule rather than the exception. The opportunities for
speech tend to be limited, either by time or space available for com-
municating or by our capacity to digest or process information.”168
Unlimited corporate sums spent on electioneering communica-
tions can distort the political marketplace by flooding it. Corporate
speech can therefore drown out non-spending voices—voices that
could otherwise add to the diversity of views heard by listeners.169
When corporations spend unlimited sums, members of the public,
who have limited time and energy to listen to electoral messages, over-
whelmingly hear from corporations who can crowd out the voices of
165. Indeed, can any of us contend that we did not hear enough from corporations
prior to Citizens United? As Professor Randall Bezanson notes in discussing Citizens United,
“there is no analysis of the doubtful premise that corporate and business interests are inad-
equately and incompletely represented in the current discourse on politics . . . .” Bezanson,
supra note 74, at 656.
166. Winkler, supra note 63, at 196–97 (arguing that even when corporations spoke
through PACs, “political speech and influence [was] . . . skewed decidedly in favor of cor-
porations and their interests”).
167. Fiss, supra note 65, at 1411.
168. Id. at 1412.
169. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 974 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that corporate speech “distort[s] public debate in ways that undermine
rather than advance the interests of listeners”); see Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1020
(“[S]peech rights given to business corporations are quite different from speech rights
given to human beings and can be expected to distort the political process in ways that are
antithetical to any theory of the First Amendment.”).
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others, particularly those who speak without spending money.170 Un-
restricted corporate speech can therefore contribute to “information
overload, by supplying an ideologically unbalanced and distorted
background, or by promoting simplistic thinking,”171 and “may often
distort our ability to hear each other.”172 Such speech also gives “the
impression that corporations dominate our democracy.”173 Hence,
there is a risk to the freedom of autonomy that occurs in the political
marketplace when corporate speech is unregulated174 because “the
First Amendment protects interests other than those of corporate
speakers who have availed themselves of the corporate ‘privilege.’”175
The volume of certain speech may need to be reduced to protect
the liberty interests of non-spending speakers and to ensure that a
diversity of voices can be heard.176 The ability to restrict a corpora-
tion’s speech increases individual freedom because “the self-realiza-
tion value requires that people be permitted to act collectively to
regulate” corporate electoral speech.177 A number of justices have ac-
170. See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, supra note 65, at 1248 (explaining that “[t]he traffic in com-
munication may call for a certain degree of regulation to avert congestion that would oth-
erwise be detrimental to the listeners’ interests” and that “[r]egulation of this
communications traffic may pass constitutional muster when it targets corporations even
though it would fail if individual speech was the target” because corporations, unlike indi-
viduals, lack self-expressive free speech rights).
171. Baker, supra note 30, at 663.
172. Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1065. Greenwood stated:
[The Court’s tact has] trivialized the important issue at stake, which is not the
neutral distribution of information but rather a political power struggle in which
rhetorical volume is extremely important—and in which corporate agents will
view their duty as requiring them to purchase the profit-maximizing volume using
money with no clear owner . . . .
Id. at 1018.
173. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 974 (Steven, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“When citizens turn on their televisions and radios before an election and hear only
corporate electioneering, they may lose faith in their capacity, as citizens, to influence
public policy.”) Justice Stevens also worried that if corporations could exert undue influ-
ence on political campaigns, the speech of officeholders who feared corporate retribution
could be chilled. Id. at 940.
174. Fiss, supra note 65, at 1411–12; see Rivard, supra note 81, at 1508 (“But if corporate
speech could ‘drown out’ other speech, then a societal interest actually may not be served;
natural persons would derive no benefit from the speech and actually could suffer harm by
being misinformed.”); Ross, supra note 37, at 462 (“Although the legislation prohibiting
corporate speech on political issues appears repugnant to the first amendment, such legis-
lation may allow individuals to remain a dominant force in the political process.”).
175. Ribstein, supra note 2, at 122.
176. Fiss, supra note 65, at 1415. See generally Bezanson, supra note 64, at 741
(“[B]roader regulation of institutional speech may better assure liberty and freedom.”).
177. Baker, supra note 30, at 654 (referring to Bellotti). Professor Baker concluded that
“as long as attempts to regulate information flows occur in ways that do not abridge indi-
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knowledged the need to promote the rights of listeners and non-
spending speakers by restricting corporate electoral speech. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority in MCFL, explained that limits on
corporate electoral speech are “meant to ensure that competition
among actors in the political arena is truly competition among
ideas.”178 Justice Stevens, dissenting in Citizens United, concluded that
restrictions on corporate electoral speech “reflect[ ] a concern to facil-
itate First Amendment values by preserving some breathing room
around the electoral ‘marketplace’ of ideas . . . .”179
In addition to harming the rights of listeners and non-spending
speakers, unregulated corporate electoral speech can undermine the
system of laws and regulations that allow corporations to exist. When
corporations are permitted to spend money in the political market-
place, and therefore to influence the rules that govern corporations,
corporations “will grow faster, thus increasing its ability to influence—
setting up a negative feedback cycle and assuring that the political
system will be distorted to allow corporations to evade the rules that
make them good for us . . . .”180 Simply put, “[t]he State need not
permit its own creation to consume it.”181 Corporations should not be
treated like political entities that have a legitimate role in the political
debate; they should be regulated.182
In sum, a corporate entity does not itself possess a right to self-
realization, and individual members of a for-profit corporation simi-
larly cannot claim that corporations’ electoral speech promotes their
self-realization or associational rights. In protecting corporate electo-
ral speech by corporations falling outside the MCFL exception, the
Court therefore necessarily focuses on the rights of listeners. Restric-
tions on corporate speech can actually promote First Amendment val-
ues by allowing for a greater diversity of speakers to be heard, which
promotes the marketplace of ideas and democratic self-govern-
viduals’ self-expression, these attempts . . . are permissible—and may make important con-
tributions to intelligent, informed, and active self-rule.” Id. at 664.
178. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986).
179. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 976 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting).
180. Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1054. Greenwood explained that corporate speech
does not facilitate self-government, but instead can “pervert the political process” by al-
lowing “corporations to influence the legal environment in which they operate [to] cre-
ate[ ] a bureaucratic monster that determines its own feeding schedule. Our servant
becomes our master.” Id. at 1054–55.
181. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
182. Greenwood, supra note 81, at 1054.
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ment.183 Restrictions can be beneficial both to those who wish to
speak without spending money and to those wishing to hear a greater
diversity of voices.184 The sad irony of the Court’s current tact is that
unrestricted for-profit corporate electoral speech actually infringes on
the First Amendment rights of listeners and non-spending speakers.
IV. The Government Has a Strong Interest in Restricting
Corporate Speech
The electoral process, of course, is the essence of our democracy. It
is an arena in which the public interest in preventing corporate
domination and the coerced support by shareholders of causes
with which they disagree is at its strongest and any claim that cor-
porate expenditures are integral to the economic functioning of
the corporation is at its weakest.185
The previous section has explained why unrestricted for-profit
electoral spending can harm the rights of listeners and non-spending
speakers. The following expands on those arguments,186 details addi-
tional threats that for-profit corporate electoral speech pose to the
183. Id. at 1062 (“Were the government to suppress the speech of the fictional share-
holder, democratic values would be vindicated, not reduced. This is because the fictional
shareholder is not a citizen but rather a creation of the legal system itself. Permitting the
fiction to manipulate the legal system reduces the likelihood that the citizenry will be able
to self-govern.”); Hill, supra note 107, at 306 (“One of the many things that our history has
taught us is that some rules are required if freedom is to be not only protected but also
enlarged. Campaign finance is part of this larger effort.”).
184. The view expressed in this Article essentially comports with what Professor Fran-
ces Hill deems the “McConnell framework.” She contrasts the framework from Wisconsin
Right to Life with the “McConnell framework”:
The [Wisconsin Right to Life] framework equates democracy with the marketplace
of ideas and wants that marketplace freed of intrusive regulation. The threat to
democracy is seen as interference with individual and corporate rights to speak
about issues and candidates in a vigorous exchange of ideas. The government is
the problem and should not be allowed to present regulation as a solution. The
McConnell framework equates democracy with an active role in elections and
equal access to the policy process. The threat to democracy is seen as a covert
process accessed through hidden influence unrelated to the formal and ostensi-
bly public policy process.
Hill, supra note 107, at 305.
185. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 821 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 811 (“This Nation has for
many years recognized the need for measures designed to prevent corporate domination
of the political process.”).
186. While the Citizens United majority cleverly treats the distortion of the political mar-
ketplace as distinct from corruption, it is in reality merely a subset of corruption. Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 970 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“The majority fails to appreciate that Austin’s antidistortion rationale is itself an
anticorruption rationale, tied to the special concerns raised by corporations.” (citation
omitted)). For more on the anti-distortion rationale, see Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United
and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV 989 (2011).
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electoral and political systems, and explains why restrictions on such
speech protect for-profit shareholders.
A. Corporate Spending Poses Unique Threats to Electoral and
Political Systems
The evils of the use of [corporate] money in connection with polit-
ical elections are so generally recognized that the committee
deems it unnecessary to make any argument in favor of the general
purpose of this measure. It is in the interest of good government
and calculated to promote purity in the selection of public
officials.187
As Part I details, Congress has implemented, and the Court has
many times upheld, laws that recognize the dangers posed by corpora-
tions in the political marketplace. These dangers are separate and dis-
tinct from any threats that spending by natural persons and, in many
cases, non-profit corporations may pose.
In the case of for-profit corporations, the government provides
corporations with these state-created benefits in order to allow them
to amass money in the economic marketplace.188 The idea is that the
more economically successful corporations can be, the more goods
they can produce, the more services they can provide, and the more
people they can employ.
However, the other consequence of providing corporations with
state-created benefits is that they have enormous sums of money,
amassed in the economic marketplace, which they can deploy in the
political marketplace.189 Individuals, while they can receive favorable
treatment from the government and can amass fortunes having no
relationship to the popularity of their views, are quite obviously not
state-created entities and are not privy to the same state-created bene-
fits as corporations, such as perpetual life, limited liability, and separa-
tion of ownership and control.190 The day humans live forever is a
187. S. REP. NO. 59-3056, at 2 (1906).
188. Watts, supra note 81, at 320 (“[A]llowing the separate incorporation of business
ventures clearly was intended to aid in the accumulation and allocation of resources for
the achievement of desirable commercial goals.”).
189. Bishop, supra note 100, at 1185–86 (“The basis for regulating the political activity
of corporations is primarily their ability to accumulate wealth and to use that wealth to
influence the political process unfairly.”).
190. Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Citizens United, and the majority noted in
Austin, that the amount of money that a corporation can accumulate in the economic
marketplace has no correlation to the popularity of that corporation’s political views. Citi-
zens United, 130 S. Ct. at 923 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Austin
v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). That seems somewhat beside
the point, however, as a wealthy individual may have amassed large sums for reasons other
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good day to take seriously the notion that corporations should be
treated the same as individuals in the political marketplace.
Legislatures and, before Citizens United, a majority of the Court
recognized that special advantages for corporations—state-created ar-
tificial entities—in the economic marketplace could translate into spe-
cial advantages or benefits in the electoral and legislative processes.191
In Bellotti, Justice Rehnquist stated that “[i]t might reasonably be con-
cluded that those properties, so beneficial in the economic sphere,
pose special dangers in the political sphere.”192 In Federal Election Com-
mission v. National Right to Work Committee (“NRWC”), the Court found
that “the special characteristics of the corporate structure require par-
ticularly careful regulation”193 and noted the need to restrict the “sub-
stantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages
which go with the corporate form of organization.”194 In Federal Elec-
tion Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee
(“NCPAC”), the Court described the need to limit “the influence of
political war chests funneled through the corporate form.”195 The
MCFL Court similarly explained that corporate electoral speech
“raises the prospect that resources amassed in the economic market-
place may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace.”196
than the popularity of that person’s views. Hence the key is that a corporation is a state-
created entity, which is endowed with many government-provided benefits. As such, corpo-
rations and members of for-profit corporations lack the First Amendment rights of
individuals.
191. Prior to Citizens United, a majority of the Court recognized this danger with respect
to corporate speech concerning candidates, but not ballot measures. See Bezanson, supra
note 74, at 656 (“[T]he size and power of corporations would more likely lead to the
conclusion that corporations are a sector in need of popular control rather than in need of
actively participating in political discourse . . . . The theory of corporations and business
organizations in the world of business ethics has for many years been premised on the
principle that their business is business, not politics.”). See generally Avi-Yonah, supra note
81, at 1036; Robert L. Kerr, Subordinating the Economic to the Political: The Evolution of the
Corporate Speech Doctrine, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 63 (2005).
192. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 826 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (“States might reasonably fear that the corporation would use its economic power to
obtain further benefits beyond those already bestowed.”).
193. NRWC, 459 U.S. 197, 209–10 (1982).
194. Id. at 207. The Court further explained that while section 441b of the FECA re-
stricted corporations of all sizes, “we accept Congress’ judgment that it is the potential for
such influence that demands regulation.” Id. at 210.
195. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm. (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480, 500
(1985).
196. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986). The Austin Court cited NCPAC and MCFL with
approval for this proposition. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659
(1990).
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-2\SAN202.txt unknown Seq: 41 16-FEB-12 12:02
Fall 2011] WE THE CORPORATIONS? 347
Citizens United ignored and recklessly blew past prior precedents
and opinions that acknowledged the problems of allowing artificial
entities with special state-created advantages to spend sums amassed
in the economic marketplace to influence electoral and legislative
processes.
But what, exactly, is the special danger posed by unlimited for-
profit corporate electoral spending? It is the potential for corruption
or the appearance of corruption.197 But this begs yet another ques-
tion, what is corruption? Since the Court’s decision in Buckley in 1976,
the Court has expanded and contracted the definition of corruption.
In Buckley, the Court embraced a narrow view of corruption, uphold-
ing contribution limits on a finding that “[t]o the extent that large
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current
and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representa-
tive democracy is undermined.”198 However, Buckley did not address
corporate spending, and hence its formulation of corruption may sim-
ply be inapplicable to the present question.
Two years after Buckley, the Bellotti Court did address the issue of
corporate electoral spending and spoke of the importance of the gov-
ernmental interest in preventing “the problem of corruption of
elected representatives through the creation of political debts.”199 In
1985, in NCPAC, the Supreme Court correctly described a broad con-
ception of corruption, covering a variety of negative behavior:
197. NRWC, 459 U.S. at 210–11 (explaining that section 441b was aimed at preventing
actual and apparent corruption and that “there is no reason why it may not be in this case
accomplished by treating . . . corporations . . . differently from individuals”); MCFL, 479
U.S. at 267 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[Section] 441b and its predecessors were enacted
to rid the political process of the corruption and appearance of corruption that accom-
pany contributions to and expenditures for candidates from corporate funds.”); Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 945 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that the restriction contained in BCRA “target[s] a class of communications
that is especially likely to corrupt the political process, that is at least one degree removed
from the views of individual citizens, and that may not even reflect the views of those who
pay for it”).
198. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976).
199. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (finding that
corruption did not arise on the question of “a corporation’s right to speak in issues of
general public interest”); see also Winkler, supra note 63, at 135 (explaining that in Bellotti,
the justices understood corruption to include “only financial quid pro quo deals between
candidates and contributors”). The Bellotti Court also spoke about governmental “interests
of the highest importance” beyond corruption, including “[p]reserving the integrity of the
electoral process, . . . ‘sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in
a democracy for the wise conduct of government,’ [and preserving] the individual citizen’s
confidence in the government.” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788–89 (quoting United States v. UAW,
352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957)).
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“[C]orruption is a subversion of the political process” whereby
“[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations
of office by the prospect of financial gain.”200 The next year, in MCFL,
the Court seemed to expand the definition of corruption even fur-
ther, at least with respect to corporate spending, and spoke about the
“concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate
wealth [which] reflects the conviction that it is important to protect
the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas.”201
In 1990, in Austin, the Court identified what remains its broadest
conception of corruption, again, in relation to corporate spending.
This so-called “new corruption” was defined as “the corrosive and dis-
torting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumu-
lated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
ideas.”202 Similarly, the Court later spoke of “the significant possibility
that corporate political expenditures will undermine the integrity of
the political process . . . .”203 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,
explained that corporate spending presents “the potential for dis-
torting the political process” not because corporations may accumu-
late vast sums of wealth, but because they receive state-created
benefits.204 In 2003, the McConnell Court cited to NRWC and specifi-
cally relied on the Austin Court’s broad understanding of corruption
to uphold the restriction in the BCRA.205
The majority in Citizens United abruptly departed from the Court’s
prior course and embraced an unnecessarily narrow definition of cor-
ruption, finding that it means just quid pro quo (literally “this for
200. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497.
201. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257.
202. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990). Justice Mar-
shall, writing for the majority, explained that “[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence
elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures.” Id. at 660. Justice
Scalia vociferously disagreed with the majority’s broad definition of corruption, arguing
that “virtually anything the Court deems politically undesirable can be turned into political
corruption—by simply describing its effects as politically ‘corrosive.’” Id. at 684 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
203. Id. at 668 (majority opinion).
204. Id. at 661. The majority again explained that “[w]hereas unincorporated unions,
and indeed individuals, may be able to amass large treasuries, they do so without the signif-
icant state-conferred advantages of the corporate structure.” Id. at 665.
205. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003) (“We have repeatedly sustained legisla-
tion aimed at ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation
to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.’” (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at
660)).
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that”).206 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Citizens United,
read Buckley as limiting the definition of corruption to quid pro quo
corruption.207 Even if that is true, one could easily argue that Buckley
did not address the specific threat that for-profit corporate electoral
spending poses, and that one must therefore rely on cases analyzing
corporate electoral speech, which all embrace a broader definition of
corruption. Justice Kennedy, however, cited his dissent in McConnell to
argue that influence and access (or the appearance of influence or
access) were not sufficient to raise the specter of corruption or its ap-
pearance, even though the majority of the Court specifically rejected
his view in McConnell.208 The majority’s crabbed view of corruption in
Citizens United means that the number of laws that can be upheld as
serving a compelling governmental interest is severely restricted.209
A broader, more common sense view of corruption is necessary to
embrace behavior which is problematic, but which cannot literally be
defined as a quid pro quo.210 For instance, in his dissent in Citizens
United, Justice Stevens espoused a view of corruption that includes
preferential access and the undue influence of an officeholder’s judg-
ment: “[T]he difference between selling a vote and selling access is a
matter of degree, not kind. And selling access is not qualitatively dif-
ferent from giving special preference to those who spent money on
one’s behalf. Corruption operates along a spectrum . . . .”211 Justice
Stevens also spoke of the need “to safeguard the integrity, competitive-
ness, and democratic responsiveness of the electoral process.”212 This
is appropriate, as society should be most concerned about situations
in which an officeholder makes or appears to make decisions based
on the best interests of those spending money on that office holder’s
behalf, and not their constituents. If the public feels that their repre-
206. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).
207. Id.
208. Justice Kennedy declared by fiat that “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corrup-
tion.” Id. at 910.
209. Id. at 962 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he major-
ity’s understanding of corruption would leave lawmakers impotent to address all but the
most discrete abuses.”).
210. Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance
Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 601 (“During debates on the earliest [campaign finance]
reform acts, the terms ‘corruption’ and ‘undue influence’ were used nearly
interchangeably.”).
211. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Stevens expressed concern about a situation in which “private interests are
seen to exert outsized control over officeholders solely on account of the money spent on
(or withheld from) their campaigns.” Id. at 962.
212. Id. at 975.
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sentatives are “in the pocket” of large donors, non-contributing con-
stituents may feel disconnected from the democratic process and,
eventually, could stop engaging in it. Ultimately, such a situation leads
to the breakdown of a representative democracy.
For-profit corporations were, are, and will always be “artificial en-
tities created by law for the purpose of furthering certain economic
goals.”213 The state provides these artificial entities with certain bene-
fits—limited liability, perpetual life, separation of ownership and con-
trol, and favorable tax treatment—to increase their economic viability
and thus strengthen the economy generally.”214 For-profit corpora-
tions were not created to be powerful political voices. The govern-
ment therefore has a compelling interest in preventing corporations
from using the state-provided benefits to obtain special benefits or ad-
vantages, such as access and influence, in the political process.215
Under the Court’s misguided decision in Citizens United, however, cor-
porations can deploy their resources to dominate both the economy
and the electoral process.216
If the government fails to regulate the ability of these state-cre-
ated entities to make political expenditures, it could actually be seen
as helping corporations to disseminate their views, such that the gov-
ernment is promoting corporate speech over electoral speech.217 This
could be viewed as a type of viewpoint discrimination.
B. Corporate Spending Can Infringe on the Rights of
Shareholders
The shareholder protection rationale . . . bolsters the conclusion
that restrictions on corporate electioneering can serve both speak-
ers’ and listeners’ interests, as well as the anticorruption interest.
And it supplies yet another reason why corporate expenditures
merit less protection than individual expenditures.218
For-profit corporations, unlike individuals or non-profit corpora-
tions, have shareholders. As discussed supra Part III.A.2, shareholders,
who by definition own the stock in corporations, buy stock for eco-
213. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 809–10.
216. Id. at 809; see also Baker, supra note 30, at 647 (“Corporate resources are sufficient
to dominate the financing of electoral as well as initiative and referendum campaigns.”).
217. Id. Indeed, without regulating for-profit corporate electoral speech, the govern-
ment could be seen as promoting corporate speech over individual speech.
218. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 979 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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nomic reasons, not for ideological or political reasons.219 The govern-
ment has a compelling interest in ensuring that individuals are not
forced to choose between forgoing investment opportunities and
funding political speech with which they disagree.220 As the Court rec-
ognized in Austin, “[a] stockholder might oppose the use of corporate
funds drawn from the general treasury—which represents, after all, his
money—in support of a particular political candidate.”221
The PAC option solves the problem of dissenting shareholders.222
PACs allow corporations to participate in the political marketplace
without using shareholder funds to advocate for the election of candi-
dates whom shareholders may not support.223 PACs are funded only
by voluntary donations from shareholders and employees who know
that their money will be used for political purposes.224
Those who criticize the need to protect dissenting shareholders,
like the majority opinions in Bellotti225 and Citizens United,226 and Jus-
tice Scalia’s dissent in Austin,227 suggest that shareholders’ rights will
be sufficiently protected if the shareholders use tools of corporate de-
mocracy (meaning voting out the board of directors), wage a deriva-
tive suit, or sell their shares.228 Not so. First, ousting members of a
219. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 805 (White, J., dissenting); Bezanson, supra note 74, at 666
(“Investors, generally, have no knowledge or intention that their contributions to a corpo-
ration (in the form of stock and partial ownership interests) may be used to fund political,
and especially partisan, speech unrelated to its general business interests in the name of
the corporation . . . .”); Winkler, supra note 63, at 163 (“[S]hareholders do not invest in
business corporations to support corporate politics, but to pursue economic gain.”).
220. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 818 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White reiterated that the
government has an interest in protecting “the right to adhere to one’s own beliefs and to
refuse to support the dissemination of the personal and political views of others, regardless
of how large a majority they may compose.” Id. at 816.
221. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 670 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); see also Brody, supra note 68, at 877 (noting that Austin recognized “economi-
cally compelled association as a reason to limit the organization’s campaign speech”).
222. Austin, 494 U.S. at 670 (Brennan, J., concurring).
223. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003).
224. Winkler, Other People’s Money, supra note 26, at 928 (“PACs reduce the likelihood
of misusing ‘other people’s money’ because funds are raised on a voluntary, knowing basis
for specifically political purposes.”).
225. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795.
226. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010).
227. Austin, 494 U.S. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. For instance, the majority in Bellotti held that in addition to being able to sell an
investment, “[a]cting through their power to elect the board of directors or to insist upon
protective provisions in the corporation’s charter, shareholders normally are presumed
competent to protect their own interests. In addition to intracorporate remedies, minority
shareholders generally have access to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge
corporate disbursements.” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794–95.
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board of directors or waging a successful derivative suit are all but
impossible hills to climb.229 Second, many shareholders hold stocks
through intermediaries, such as pension plans or mutual funds. Insti-
tutional investors have little control over their shares and would be
forced to sell the shares of other stocks if they wished to sell the shares
of only one corporation making electioneering communications with
which they disagreed.230 Third, for any shareholder, whether she owns
shares through an intermediary or not, that shareholder’s expressive
injury has already occurred by the time the shareholder sells her
shares.231 Fourth, there may be tax penalties associated with divesting
shares.232 Lastly, shareholders, particularly in large corporations, may
find it difficult to monitor the electoral activities of the corporations
in which they own stock.233
Each of these options—selling shares, using tools of corporate
democracy, or waging a derivative suit—therefore presents insuffi-
cient protection for shareholders and presents shareholders with an
untenable choice. Whether or not shareholders agree with the mes-
sage, under Citizens United, corporations can use unlimited share-
holder money on electioneering communications.234 The current
situation is therefore problematic for shareholders.235
229. Winkler, supra note 63, at 164 (noting that “management exercises nearly unfet-
tered control over the corporation’s assets”); see also Winkler, The Corporation in Election
Law, supra note 26, at 1265–66 (detailing the broad discretion given to corporate managers
under traditional corporate law and the business judgment rule).
230. Winkler, supra note 63, at 166–67.
231. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. Id.
233. Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1117
(2009); see, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 674 n.5 (1990).
234. Citizen United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.
235. As Adam Winkler has noted, “[t]here are two categories of association views mani-
fested in election laws: one that sees corporate association as perilous to its members, and
one that sees it as salutary to its members.” Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, supra
note 26, at 1260. Winkler explained that “[t]he perilous association view is reflected in
election laws designed to protect members of the corporation to whom the political activity
of the corporation may pose harm, such as stockholders who do not wish to finance corpo-
rate political activities.” Id. at 1261. In contrast, “the salutary view conceives of the corpo-
rate association as beneficial to its members.” Id. at 1266. For reasons discussed supra, for-
profit corporate spending may fall under the former category, while non-profit corporate
spending more likely falls within the latter.
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Conclusion: What Type of Non-profit Corporations Should be
Exempt from Restrictions on Corporate Electoral Speech?
By detailing the history of congressional regulation over corpo-
rate electoral speech, Supreme Court cases addressing those restric-
tions, the theories behind the importance of the First Amendment,
and the conceptions of the corporate personality, this Article demon-
strates that for-profit corporate electoral speech does not support the
First Amendment interests of the corporation itself, the individual
members of for-profit corporations, those listening to corporate
speech, or those speaking without spending money. To the contrary,
unrestricted for-profit corporate electoral speech can harm the rights
of shareholders, listeners, and non-spending speakers. In addition,
this Article elucidates the real and legitimate threats that for-profit
corporate electoral speech pose to the integrity of the electoral and
legislative systems. Simply put, the speech interests of a for-profit
speaker are low and the government’s interests in restricting that
speech is high.
Many non-profit corporations, by contrast, do have a legitimate
role to play in the political marketplace.236 When those non-profit cor-
porations speak, the corporation’s electoral speech can be traced to
the speech of the members of the corporation, such that their First
Amendment interests of both speech and association are fostered by
the corporation’s speech. In addition, the simple fact is that non-
profit corporations are not formed to amass money in the economic
marketplace, money that can be used to obtain special advantages in
the political marketplace. Non-profit corporate electoral speech,
236. Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat suggests that a more helpful demarcation is between
democratic associations and non-democratic associations. Bhagwat, supra note 63, at 981.
Bhagwat argues that the key issue is not whether the speaker is a corporation, but whether
the speaker “is an association that contributes to self-governance.” Id. at 1024. Bhagwat
draws a distinction based on the goals of the association, and would give more protection
to associations whose main goals are “relevant to the democratic process,” such as “political
organization, value formation, and the cultivation of skills relevant to participation in the
democratic process.” Id. at 1000. Under Bhagwat’s thesis, organizations whose primary
goals are “immaterial to democracy,” such as associations whose goal is to make money—
for-profit corporations, and limited and professional partnerships—would not be entitled
to the same level of First Amendment protection as “democratic associations.” Id. Bhagwat
argues that “[w]hen associations express the joint views of their members, they are engag-
ing in conduct that stands at the intersection of the assembly, association, petition, and
speech provisions of the First Amendment.” Id. at 1022. Bhagwat’s suggestion in many ways
tracks the recommendations of this Article. However, Bhagwat’s suggestion may present
line-drawing problems. It could mean that non-profit corporate political speech would be
subject to endless evidentiary hearings, and hence could chill protected speech. This Arti-
cle instead advocates for the imposition of a de minimis exception to MCFL.
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therefore, presents fewer dangers to the integrity of electoral and po-
litical processes.
All of this is true, however, only for certain non-profit corpora-
tions. Justice Kennedy noted in Austin that some organizations view
“the nonprofit corporate form [a]s the only feasible way of organizing
so that they can transmit important views to the public as a whole.”237
In such cases, non-profit corporations are the modern day equivalent
of political associations.
MCFL is the quintessential example of such a corporation.238 The
characteristics of MCFL made it more like a voluntary political associa-
tion than a for-profit corporation, and hence its electoral speech was
and should be protected regardless of whether or not it was an incor-
porated or unincorporated association.239 The relatively elevated
speech and associational rights of the members of MCFL and low gov-
ernment interest in restricting MCFL’s political speech dictated that
MCFL should not be subject to the law prohibiting corporate electoral
speech.240
The proposal contained in this Article, to treat for-profit corpo-
rate electoral speech as subject to restrictions and non-profit electoral
speech as protected, only works if the non-profit corporations are—
like MCFL—formed for an ideological purpose, do not have members
who are dis-incentivized from disassociating with the non-profit based
on its electoral speech, and are not used as conduits for massive for-
profit corporate spending. This Article suggests that the Court should
follow the lead of many lower courts and apply a de minimis excep-
tion to the third prong of MCFL,241 such that if a non-profit corpora-
tion does not have a specific policy against accepting for-profit
corporate contributions and receives a certain percentage of its total
237. Austin, 494 U.S. at 711 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy further noted
that “[b]ecause the unincorporated association structure carries with it a high risk of per-
sonal liability for members and operates in an uncertain legal climate, groups often prefer
to organize in nonprofit corporate form.” Id. Justice Kennedy stated that, “[b]y deciding to
operate as a nonprofit corporation rather than an unincorporated association, a group
does not forfeit its First Amendment protection to participate in political discourse.” Id. at
712.
238. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 241–42 (1986).
239. Id. at 259–63. Justice Brennan concluded that “[w]hile MCFL may derive some
advantages from its corporate form, those are advantages that redound to its benefit as a
political organization, not as a profit-making enterprise.” Id. at 259.
240. “Voluntary political associations do not suddenly present the specter of corrup-
tion merely by assuming the corporate form.” Id. at 263.
241. The third prong of MCFL provides that a non-profit corporation cannot act as a
conduit for for-profit corporate electoral spending, and must have a policy of not ac-
cepting contributions from such corporations. Id. at 264.
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assets—perhaps 10% or less242—from for-profit corporations, the cor-
poration would still fall within the exception proscribed by MCFL.243
Each of the five circuits to address the question of whether there
should be a de minimis exception to MCFL answered that question in
the affirmative.244 These courts each focused on the third prong of
MCFL and found that the fact that a non-profit lacked a specific policy
against the acceptance of corporate contributions, and, in some cases,
accepted a certain amount of such contributions, did not take a non-
profit outside of the protection of MCFL. These courts found that the
purpose of the third prong of MCFL was to prevent otherwise qualify-
ing non-profit corporations from acting as conduits for for-profit cor-
porate spending, which was not traceable to members of the
corporation and could threaten the integrity of the political market-
place. This Article argues that the Court should follow suit and hold
that certain non-profit corporations should be able to fund electoral
speech through general treasury funds if the vast majority of those
funds can be traced to individual donors. This solution is meant to
strike the proper balance between the First Amendment and govern-
mental interests at play.245
Most recently, in Colorado Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Coffman,
the Tenth Circuit concluded that “MCFL does not establish an immo-
bile set of parameters,” but rather that the MCFL factors are merely
used to determine whether a corporation is more like a business cor-
poration or more like a political association.246 In 1994, in Day v. Hola-
han, the Eighth Circuit—the first circuit to explore this question—
explained that the purpose of the third prong of the MCFL test was to
“ensure[ ] that political resources reflect political support.”247 In
242. Setting a fixed percentage for the de minimis exception would avoid a case by
case analysis of whether a corporation fit within the exception. Id. at 239 n.2.
243. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 937 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Court could have expanded the MCFL exemption to cover
§ 501(c)(4) nonprofits that accept only a de minimis amount of money from for-profit
corporations . . . . Numerous Courts of Appeal have held that de minimis business support
does not, in itself, remove an otherwise qualifying organization from the ambit of MCFL.”).
244. Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1148 (10th Cir. 2007).
245. See Baker, supra note 30, at 647 (“Even if frequently evaded, legal restraints may
limit the degree to which corporations become involved in the financing of electoral
campaigns.”).
246. Coffman, 498 F.3d at 1148.
247. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1364 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. 238,
264 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Day court specifically found that with
respect to accepting contributions from business corporations, “the key issue here is the
amount of for-profit corporate funding a nonprofit receives, rather than the establishment
of a policy not to accept significant amounts.” Id.
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1995, in Federal Election Commission v. Survival Education Fund, Inc., the
Second Circuit held that the only reason the restriction should apply
to a non-profit political advocacy corporation is if the business corpo-
rations used a non-profit corporation to “funnel their wealth, which
derives from the commercial marketplace, into the political market-
place of ideas.”248
Continuing on the same trend, in 1999, in North Carolina Right to
Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, the Fourth Circuit explained that the purpose of
the third prong of MCFL was to ensure that a non-profit did not serve
as “a conduit ‘for the type of direct spending [by for-profit corpora-
tions] that creates a threat to the political marketplace.’”249 In 2001,
in Federal Election Commission v. National Rifle Association, the court held
that the question of whether a non-profit advocacy corporation fell
within the MCFL exception was whether the corporation’s “political
activities threaten to distort the electoral process through the use of
resources that . . . reflect the organization’s ‘success in the economic
marketplace’ rather than ‘the power of its ideas.’”250 The court ap-
plied the MCFL exception to a non-profit that did accept some corpo-
rate contributions but did not serve as “a conduit for political
spending by its corporate members.”251
Hence, instituting a de minimis exception to MCFL would protect
First Amendment rights and promote compelling governmental inter-
ests. The effect of this proposal is similar to that which would occur by
implementing the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment contained in the
BCRA.252 The Snowe-Jeffords Amendment provided that certain non-
248. FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, Inc., 65 F.3d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1995). The court fur-
ther held that:
Under MCFL, a nonprofit political advocacy corporation having no shareholders
or members with financial disincentives to disassociate from the corporation if
they disagree with its views is exempt from § 441b as long as it is independent in
fact from significant business or labor influence. The existence of a policy against
accepting contributions from business corporations or unions is relevant to, but
not dispositive of, the issue of independence.
Id.
249. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 714 (4th Cir. 1999) (alteration in
original) (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 265).
250. FEC v. Nat’l Rifle Assoc. of Am., 254 F.3d 173, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting
MCFL, 479 U.S. at 458–59).
251. Id.
252. That amendment was to take effect only if another amendment to the BCRA, the
so-called “Wellstone Amendment,” was invalidated. The Wellstone Amendment applied
the prohibition on corporations’ use of general treasury funds on electioneering commu-
nications to all non-profit corporations, but was read by the McConnell Court as maintain-
ing an exception under MCFL for certain non-profit corporations. McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93, 771 (2003).
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profit corporations, organized under section 501(c)(4)253 and
527(e)(1)254 of Title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code, which were
funded only by individual donors and maintained money used for
electoral speech in a segregated account, fell outside of the general
prohibition contained in the BCRA.255
The proposal put forth in this Article, and in the Snowe-Jeffords
Amendment, essentially treats speech by non-profit corporations that
are akin to corporate PACs as protected. In NCPAC, the Court struck
down limits on campaign expenditures by PACs, emphasizing that the
speech interests of individuals joined together to express political
viewpoints were protected—in contrast to the economic interests ad-
vanced directly by the “special advantages . . . on the corporate
form.”256 The same is true of non-profit corporations falling within
MCFL, or a de minimis exception to that case. In both instances, the
organizations are formed for an ideological purpose and allow indi-
viduals to voluntarily pool their money for that purpose. Hence, the
organization’s speech can be traced to its individual donors and mem-
bers, and there are no fears of harming shareholders.257
In the First Amendment arena, the general rule must be the less
government intrusion, the better. However, this Article addresses the
need for government regulation only of its own creation—for-profit
253. 501(c)(4) non-profit corporations are:
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively
for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the mem-
bership of which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in
a particular municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to
charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2006). Citizens United is a 501(c)(4) organization.
254. A 527 non-profit corporation is “a party, committee, association, fund, or other
organization (whether or not incorporated) organized and operated primarily for the pur-
pose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or both, for
an exempt function.” I.R.C. § 527(e)(1). Section 527 groups include segregated funds es-
tablished by many 501(c) organizations.
255. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(2) (providing that the prohibition on a corporation’s use of
general treasury funds on electioneering communications did not apply to communica-
tions made by a 501(c)(4) organization or a 527(e)(1) political organization, if the com-
munication was funded solely by individuals); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876,
891 (2010) (“The Snowe-Jeffords Amendment would exempt from § 441b’s expenditure
ban the political speech of certain nonprofit corporations if the speech were funded ‘ex-
clusively’ by individual donors and the funds were maintained in a segregated account.”).
For an excellent discussion on the impact of Citizens United on certain non-charitable tax-
exempt organizations, see Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Ex-
empt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363 (2011).
256. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 494–95 (1985).
257. Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, supra note 26, at 1269.
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corporations. Regulation of these artificial entities will promote the
First Amendment rights of individuals, whether they are members of
corporations, non-spending speakers, or listeners.
